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PREJAOE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to clarify the 
notion ot common sense in the philosophy of G. E. Moore. As 
such, it will serve as no more than a propaedeutic tor evaluating 
whether a common sense philosophy is viable. The scope of dis-
cussion is admittedly JD.70pic: there is no presentation of earlier 
common sense philosophies, nor criticisms of such philosophies. 
~e only excuse tor this omission is that it is impossible thor-
~ughly to discuss even the twentieth-century material in a short 
work. For this reason, this paper can serve as little more than 
a "preliminary propaedeutic." 
To Pr. Maziarz I extend a sincere thank you for allowing 
philosophy to be enjoyable and dull. 
11 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, idealism was 
the philosophy of the day. 1 '?o a great extent, it was G. E. 
-
Moore who brought about the downfall of idealism, and gave early 
twentieth-century thought its thrust towards realism. Yet it is 
important to notice that the philosophical community was ripe tor 
this transition. 'l'he following remarks are designed to indicate 
some of the philosophers who contributed to this climate. 
A. From Scotland to America 
One or the origins of twentieth-century realism la;y in 
the Scottish common sense philosophy of 'l'homas Reid (1710-1?96) 
In addition to the abbreviations used in the bibliographJ 
the following abbreviations are used in the footnotes. 
Works by Moore: 
di • !he Commonplace Book of G. E. Moore, 1919-1953 
""'Befence"• irx-Detence of! Ooiim'Oii' lJinse"-
Lectures • Lectures on Philoso:ebz, ed. by c. Lew.y 
PE • :P.i'!ncl:eia~hlca 
'15roottt • "Proof of! an Eiternal 'World" 
"Reply,. • "A Reply to f\y' Critics" 
SMPP • Some Main Problems ot Philoso:phY 
Other-Works: - -
EM • The !Pistemolo~ of G. E. Moore, by E. D. Klemke 
1[Q! • g. !• Moore: A ritical-Exposltion, by A. R. White 
l"'?he main tendency of nineteenth-century thought was 
towards the conclusion that both 'things' and tacts about things 
are dependent for their existence and their nature upon the oper-
ations ot a mind." John Passmore, A Hundred Years of PhilosopbY (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p7 1?4. --
1 
2 
and Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856). 2 This naive form of real-
ism was, like Kant's critical philosophy, a reaction to the scep-
ticism of Hume. While Scottish common sense philosophy had some 
effect upon English philosophers, including Moore,3 it had even 
more of an impact in America, where it was introduced by John 
Witherspoon (1723-1794) and James Mccosh (1811-1894). 4 However, 
its impact in America was tempered by German idealism, which was 
imported sho~tly afterwards. And the realism that was kept alive 
--by philosophers like Francis Ellingwood Abbot (1837-1903) and 
Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914)--was subjected to yet another 
current of thought: continental philosophy. 
B. Continental Assistance 
Two continental philosophers were instrumental in the 
~ise of realism in America and England. 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) called attention to the inten-
tional character of knowledge: the distinctive characteristic of 
mental phenomena is that they point towards an object. But this 
lfirst step towards realism was brought up short by the question 
2cf. E. Hershey Sneath's introduction to The Philosoph.y 
of Reid (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1892), pp.-rr-61 ands. A. 
~ave, The Scottish Philosophy a.! Comr~on Sense (Oxford: Claren-
ion PreS"S';" 1960). 
3cr. M:CE, pp. 191-9. Rev. Denis Cleary, I.e. argues 
!that there is--a-"°lack of historical sense" in Moore's philosophy, 
and Cambridge philoso:phy in general. "An Essay on G.E. Moore," 
Downs. Rev., 81 (1963) 9 214-6, 223-5. 
4Herbert W. Schneider, A Histori of American Philosophl• 
2d ed. (New York: Columbia Univ7 ~ross, 1°9b3), pp. 216-20. 
3 
of how objects are related to mental acts. Prior to 1900, Bren-
tano held that the object of ~nowledge is identical with the con-
tent which one has before his mind. But this position gave rise 
to the problem of fictional things: a centaur may be a content of 
r. 
a mental act, but it is not an independent object./ It was Mei-
nong who found a solution to this problem. 
Alexius von Meinong (1853-1920) accepted the intentional 
character of knowledge, but deemed it inc~edible to consider a 
physical object as being identical with, or a constituent or, a 
mental act. To resolve this problem, he adopted Twardowski's 
distinction of (i) the mental act, (ii) its content, and (iii) 
its objects. This enabled him to say that fictional things are 
the objects of thought, but not the content of thought (since the 
content exists). 6 It was Meinong's contribution to the problem 
of the intentional or referential character of knowing fictional 
things which was first adopted by American realists. 
C. American Realism 
When Josiah Royce (1855-1916) stated his opposition to 
~ealism, his former pupils, R. B. Perry (1876-1957) and w. P. 
Montague (1873-1953), were quick to provide a defense. The es-
sence of Royce's attack on realism was this: if the objects of 
5Passmore, .QJ2.• cit., pp. 1?8-80. See also: Roderick M. 
Chisholm (ed), Realism and the-Background of Phenomenology (New 
York: Free Press, 1960)-;J?°p:--4-6. ~ 
6Passmore, .2£• £!.!., pp. 180-1, 556 n. 10; Chisholm, .2£• 
cit., pp. 6-12 • 
.......... 
4 
knowledge are completely independent of our knowing them, then 
there is no relation possible, not even the knowing relation. 
The essence of the reply to Royce was that relatedness and inde-
pendence are compatible characteristics of knowledge and its ob-
. t 7 JeC • Somewhat later, it was argued that they are compatible 
because, as James and Russell had shown, relations are external. 
From this it follows, presuming that knowledge is a rela-
tion, that the known is not constituted by its relation 
to the knower, or the knower by its relation to the 
known, or either knower or known by the fact that it is 
a constituent in the knowledge relation.8 
The exchange between Royce and his pupils brought out the 
central issue in American realism: the relation between the ob-
ject and that through which the object is known. There was gen-
eral agreement ~ knowledge of independent objects is possible. 
The intentionality of perception and knowledge is prima facie 
evidence for this. Then too, our knowledge is both reliable and 
seemingly not a consequence of our purpose, which suggests that 
it is an effect of independent objects. Thirdly, both our exper-
ience and our language "presuppose" the independence of the ob-
jects of knowledge, and it seemed difficult, if not impossible, 
to regard these as nonsense.9 However, it was difficult to 
?Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, 1900; R. B. 
Perry, "Professor RoyceTSRefutatIO!i "OrRealism and Pluralism," 
Monist, 12 (1902), pp. 446-58;; w. P. Montaguet "Professor Royce's 
He.futation of Realism," Philos. ~·, 2 (1902;, pp. 43-55· 
8Passmore, .212• .£!..:!!., p. 261. 
9Thomas English Hill, Contemporar~ Theories of Knowledge 
(New York: Ronald Press Co., 1961), pp. l 0-21. 
5 
explain this common sense relation: !!2.! are knowledge and its ob-
jects related? It was in answering this question that two 
"schools" developed in America: the new realists and the critical 
1 . t 10 rea is s. 
1. New Realism was characterized by monism: there is no 
-----
distinction between the object and that through which it is 
known. Knowledge is a direct apprehension of its object. Thus, 
in an attempt to describe experience without reference to con-
sciousness, Perry spoke of ideas as "things in a certain rela-
tion." However, this lack of distinction between a subjective 
and objective knowing made it very difficult for the new realists 
to adequately account for error without compromising the indepen-
dence of the object. And realists such as w. P. Montague (1873-
1953) who did make this distinction found it difficult to avoid a 
representative or dualistic account of knowledge. 11 
2. Critical Realism was characterized by dualism: there 
~s a distinction between the object and that through which it is 
Known. That is, the critical realists assert "that there are 
three distinct ingredients in perception--the perceiving act, 
'3omething given ••• and the object perceived. 1112 
With idealist against new realists, critical realists 
have properly claimed that (1) knowledge involves at 
one state or another an active experiencing that cannot 
lOibid., p. 119 9 Passmore,~·£.!.!., p. 260, Chisholm, 
~· .£?..!!., pp. 22-34. 
11~., pp. 122-4; Passmore, 2.E• £!_!.,pp. 263-4. 
12Pa.ssmore, op. cit., p. 283. 
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be assimilated to objects. With new realists against 
idealists, critical realists have rightly claimed that 
r2J knowledge involves objects that are independent of 
being known. And with both against representative real-
ists, critical realists have recognized that [3] knowledge 
is apprehension not merely of one's own cognitive experi-
ences but of the objects themselves intended in such ex-
periences.13 
The problem in this case was to explain ~ knowledge can be both 
mediated and direct. How are independent objects (and not merely 
sense data) known? To avoid a sceptical solution, the critical 
realists held that what is given is a datum which points beyond 
itself to an object. But there was considerable controversy over 
the nature of what is given. George Santayana (1863-1952), ~or 
example, held that the given is a set of universals or essences. 
R. w. Sellars (1880-19 ), on the other hand, believed that the 
given is a set of particulars which reveal the structure of the 
object. 
D. English Realism 
The realism which sprang up in England arose from various 
sources. For example, the realism developed by John Cook Wilson 
(1874-1915) grew out of his interest in logic. Others--like Sam-
uel Alexander (1859-1938), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), 
Bertrand Russell (1872-19?0) and C. D. Broad (188?-19 )--were 
Primarily concerned with the problems of science. Finally, there 
were those like T. P. Nunn (1870-1944) and G. E. Moore (18?3-
1958), whose realism was bound up with the notion of common sense. 
l3Hill, .2.12• .£.!.i•• P• 155. 
CHAPTER II 
MOORE ON COMMON SENSE 
George Edward Moore (1873-1958) began his schooling at 
Dulwich College in London. When he was eighteen, he went to Tri-
~i ty College, Cambridge to pursue his interest in classical stu-
dies. Moore had almost completed his second year of studies (in 
1894) before he decided to study philosophy. 1 Moore's philoso-
phical curiosity was piqued by the things philosophers like J. E. 
M. McTaggart had said about the world, for their philosophical 
assertions seemed to contradict common sense. 2 F. H. Bradley was 
unequivocal on this subject; he "argued that everything common 
sense believes is mere appearance."3 Under this kind of influ-
ence, Moore's confidence in common sense waned. His first publi-
cation showed that he had made an about-face. 4 
1 G. E. Moore, "An Autobiography," ~. p. 13. 
2Ibid., p. 14. Broad once asked, "In what place is th~ 
mirror-imageof a pin?" Russell thought that the answer is: "In 
~our head." Moore observed: "Whether you are interested in the 
question whether Russell is right as to this or not is • • • a 
good test of whether you will be interested in philosophy or not." 
"The Justification of Analysis," Analysis, 1 (1934), p. 29. 
3Bertrand RusBell, "Autobiography," The Philoso~bx of 
~ertrand Russell, ed. by Paul A. Schilpp (Lonaon: dambridge-Univ • 
.Press, l946J, P• 36. 
4 
"In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?" 
Mind, n.s., 6 (1897), pp. 235-40. 
7 
He argued that time does not exist, and he did so using 
Bradley's methods and premises, in particular the dogmas 
of internal relations and concrete universals and the 
principle that identifies reali·t;y with the absence of 
contTadiction. When his conclusions, like the one that 
time does not exist, proved to outrage common sense, 
Moore was prepared to say that common sense is simply 
wrong, and he did so more than once.' 
8 
After graduation in 1896, Moore began working on a paper 
in order to compete for a fellowship at Trinity. 6 It was during 
[this period that 1'1oore severed his philosophical ties to idealism. 
He describes the period from 1897-8 as "the beginning of a break-
away from belief in Bradley's philosophy, of which, up till about 
rthen, both Russell and I had, following McTaggart, been enthusi-
astic admirers."? What is significant in this break is that com-
mon sense became more than a mere starting point in Moore's phil-
psophy. It became the foundation of his philosophy. 
This chapter will indicate how Moore def ended the truth 
pf common sense, and then attempt to discover some identifying 
~haracteristics of common sense. 
A. Moore's Defense 2f. Common Sense: Ag Ex:position 
This section contains merely a summary of two passages in 
which Moore presents a defense of common sense. 
5John O. Nelson, "George Edward Moore, 11 The Enc~clo~edia 
~ Philosouh~, ed. by Paul Edwards, Vol. 5 (New-yQrk:acm llun, 
L96?), p. ~7 . 
6Moore submitted his paper in 1898 and won a six-year 
nPrize" Fellowship. His paper was published the following year 
under the title: "The Nature of Judgment." 
7Moore, .2.E.• £!.i., P• 22. 
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1. "A Defence .2f Common Sense" (1925). This article be-
~ins with (1) a list of common sense truisms which Moore knows, 
~ith certainty, to be true. 
There exists at present a living human body, which is 
~ body. This body was born at a certain time in the 
past, and has existed continuously ever since, though 
not without undergoing changes ••• Among the things 
which have, in this sense, formed part of its environ-
ment (i.e., have been either in contact with it, or 
at some distance from it, however great) there have, 
at every moment since its birth, been large numbers of 
other living human bodies, each of which has, like it, 
(a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist from 
some time after birth ••• Finally (to come to a differ-
ent class of propositions), I am a human being, and I 
have, at different times since my body was born, had 
many different experiences, of each of many different 
kinds: e.g., I hav8 often perceived both my own body and 
other things • • • 
Next, Moore adds (2) a single truism: many human beings have fre-
quently known "a proposition correspondin5 to each of the propo-
sitions in (l)."9 Finally, he enumerates (3) some implications 
of his list of truisms: (i) material things are real; (ii) space 
li.s real; (iii) time is real; and (iv) at least one self is real.le 
If, for example, "I have often had dreams, and have had many dif-
ferent feelings at different times," it follows that time is real 
Moore's thesis is that (2) and (3) are true. He begins 
his defense by noting: 
There are some philosophers, who, while denying that (in 
the senses in question) either material things or Space 
8
"Defence " PP p 33 ' _, . . 
9Ibid., P• 34. 
-
lOibid., pp. 38-39. 
-
10 
are real, have been willing to admit that Selves and Time 
are real, in the sense required. Other philosophers, on 
the other hand, have used the expression 'Time is not 
real,' to express ••• something which is inconpatible 
with the truth of any of the propositions in (1).11 
rJbile such expressions as "Material things are not real" may be 
~biguous, their ordinary usage is certainly incompatible with 
(2). As such, they are certa:Lnly false. Moore offers four argu-
ments to substantiate his claim. First of all, a denial of (2) 
or any of the implications stated in (3) is incompatible with the 
~ery existence of any philosopher. The philosopher's own spa-
tial, temporal existence prohibits him from denying the reality 
of space, time and selves. That is, philosophers are human 
beings; and this is to say that they have had experiences corres-
oonding to Moore's list of truisms. Secondly, "no philosopher 
bas ever been able to hold such views consistently. 1112 He would, 
ifor example, allude to a "we" who do not know such and such. 
All philosophers have belonged to the class of human beings 
which exists only if (2) be true: that is to say, to the 
~~~~= ~~r~'!!:~~n~~!:g~ow~~c~a~~ ~~=q~~~;~~i~~~ l~0~~)~I3 
Thirdly, some philosophers contend that the list of truisms pro-
posed by Moore are not "wholly true, because every such proposi-
tion entails both of two incompatible propositions. 1114 Moore 
11Ibid., P• 39. 
-12Ibid., p. 40. 
-
l3Ibid., p. 41. 
-14Ibid. This objection and Moore's reply are too laconic 
to be clear:--For Moore's possible meaning, cf. bis Lectures, pp. 
20 rr. 
11 
replies, "All of the propositions in (1) are true; no true propo-
sition entails both of two incompatible propositons; therefore. 
none of the propositions in (1) entails both of two incompatible 
propositions. 111 5 Finally, the truth of the propositions in (3) 
is clear from the fact that all of the propositions in (1) are 
true. This is, Moore claims, his best argument. 16 
Other philosophers have objected to Moore's insistence 
that he is certain. The objection is that no one knows for cer-
tain propositions about the existence of material things or 
selves. Moore replies that this objection is self-contradictory. 
When be says "No human being has ever known of the 
existence of other human beings," he is saying: "There 
have been many other human beings beside myself, and 
none of them (including myself) has ever known of the 
existence of other human beings. 111? 
2. "Proof of an External World" (1939). In this arti-
cle, Moore attempts to offer a conclusive proof of the existence 
of "things outside of us." 
(a) With an eye on Kant's discussion of this problem, 
Moore spends a good deal of time clarifying the notion of "things 
outside of us." His analysis results in identifying "things out-
side of us" with "things to be met with in space." (Thus he ex-
cludes things which are external to our mind and Eresented in 
~pace, but which are not ~ in space--such as after-images, 
16Ibid., p. 42. 
-
l?Ibid., PP• 42-3. 
12 
double images, bodily pains and dreams~)18 He concludes this 
part by saying: 
I want now to emphasize that I am so using 'things to be 
met with in space' that, in the case of each of these kinds 
of 'things,• from the proposition that there are 'things' 
of that kind it follows that there are things to be met 
with in space: e.g., rrom the proposition that there are 
plants or that plants exist it follows that there are 
things to be met with in space.19 
(b) Moore then proceeds to show that anything which is to 
be met with in space must be external to my mind. Consider the 
differences between what is external to my mind and what is i!!, my 
mind. One difference is that what is external to my mind (e.g., 
my body) is to be met with in space, whereas what is in my mind 
(e.g., bodily pain) is not to be met with in space. But there is 
a second, and more important difference. 
Whereas there is a contradiction in supposing a pain which 
I feel or an after-image which I see to exist at a time 
when I am having no experience, there is no contradiction 
in supposing mx body to exist at a time when I am having 
no experience.20 
1811Proof," PP, pp. 131-6. Regarding this section, Levi 
observes: anoore's pUrpose in this analysis is not merely to show 
that 'things presented in space' fall outside the conception of 
'things external to our minds,• but also to underline the doc-
trine of a realistic epistemology that 'there is no contradiction 
in supposing that there have been and are to be met with in space 
things which never have been, are not now, and never will be per-
ceived.'" Philoso)hy and the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1959 , p:---45~ 
19Ibid., p. 137. The reason this follows is that there 
could not Dea plant which was not to be met with in space. (p.13 s: 
20Ibid., p. 143. Cf. also: CB, p. 106. Klemke states 
Moore's po1nrvery clearly. "For any object X: a) X is in my 
mind, if from a proposition that X exists at time tl, there logi-
cally follows a proposition that I was having an experience at 
tl. b) X is external to my mind, if from a proposition that X 
exists at tl, there does not logically follow a proposition that 
13 
fhus, what is to be met with in space does not imply that I am 
experiencing it, which is to say, it is external to my mind. 
Combining his first and second analyses, Moore offers 
nis proof. 
There are ever so many kinds of 'things', such that, in 
the case of each of these kinds, from the proposition 
that there is at least one thing of that kind there fol-
lows the proposition [l] that there is at least one thing 
to be met with in space ••• [and, 2] that there is at 
least one thing external to our minds: e.g., from 'There 
is at least one star' there follows not only 'There is 
at least one thing to be met with in space" but also 
'There is at least one external thing•.21 
rehus Moore contends that by holding up his two hands• he has pro-
iven the existence of external things. He considers this a proof 
I was having an experience at tl. 11 "G. E. Moore's Proof of an 
External World, 11 !Im• p. 279. 
21Ibid., pp. 143-4. Moore's "Proof" is also summarized 
oy Klemke.---rii the second part of his article, Klemke proposes 
the following explicit formulation of Moore's argument. 
"Let us adopt the following as abbreviations to be used 
in the full proo~: 
E\tl: external world 
OU: outside of us 
E: external 
EM: external to our minds 
EE: empirically external 
rm: to be met with in space 
H: hand 
HE,t: has an experience, at time t 
fhen Moore's 12!:Q£f .of an external world is: 
i) o~ • -me • Msx = Ef'bC 
2~ ~$ x) (x • x~ tl) + (3y) (HEy, tl)J ~EMx 3 3x) (Hx, tl fr(3y) (HE, tl) 
4 x) (Hx, tl ~ (3 x) EMx 
5~ E\.lz .. (3x) (3y) r(EMx. EMy). (y" :x:)J 
6 (Ha • Hb) • (a ,Eb) 
? ••• (3 x) (3 y) E(Hx • Hy) • ( y 1' x) J 
8) .•. (3x) (3y) (EMx: • EfV) • (y 1' x)J 
9) (3 z ) EW'z " 
"G. E. Moore Proof of Ext l 1-1 ld " SPM 28') an erna wOr 9 ___ , p. ~. 
14 
Decause it fulfills the necessary conditions tor having a proot; 
(1) the conclusion is ditterent .from the premiss, {2) the premiss 
is certain, and (3) the conclusion follows trom the premiss. To 
one who objects that he has not proved the premiss, Moore replies 
~hat he did not intend to do so, nor is it possible to do so. 
"How am I to prove now that 'Here's one hand, and here's ano-
ther'? I do not believe I can do it."22 But this situation does 
not alter the tact that "I can know things, which I cannot 
prove."23 
B. Moore's Notion .2! Common Sense: Al! Intez:pretation 
In order to appreciate Moore's philosophical starting 
point, and his reasons tor regarding it as foundational. it is 
~eeessary to answer two preliminary questions: (1) when is a 
statement to be considered a statement of common sense? and (2) 
~hen is a statement or common sense true? 
The main problem in attempting to answer these questions 
is that Moore did not explicitly deal with them. So the only way 
or finding an answer is to carefully observe Moore's use or com-
mon sense, and then state what is implicit in his use. !'ltl.s has 
been done by Alan R. White. 24 White contends that there i~ deri-
~itely one, and possibly two criteria by which to determine whe-
22Ibid., P• 149 • 
............... 
23Ibid., P• 150. 
24White, "Moore's Appeal to Common Sense," Ph.ilos., 33 {1958), 221-39; M:OE, PP• 9·20. 
15 
ther a statement is actually a statement of common sense: univer-
sal acceptance and, possibly, compulsive acceptance. White also 
contends that there are several additional criteria by which to 
determine whether a statement of common sense is true: inconsis-
tency, a particular type of inconsistency, and self-evidence. 
He leaves unanswered the question as to which of these criteria 
is necessary or sufficient to determine the truth of a common 
sense belief. 
In this section, I will present White's analysis, and 
then attempt to show why it needs to be reformulated. My purpose 
will be to determine what are the criteria of common sense and 
its truth. 
1. Criteria for Common Sense Statements. According to 
--- --~-- ~---
White, the first characteristic of all common sense statements is 
that of universal acceptance. 25 This means that only statements 
which are "commonly or generally or universally or constantly 
~ssumed to be true" can be considered statements of common 
aense. 26 For example, it is generally accepted as true that the 
~arth had existed for many years before we were born. 27 The sec-
pnd criterion suggested by White is that of compulsive accep-
tance. 28 For example• we cannot help believing in the existence 
25M:CE, p. 11. Klemke agrees with White on this and the 
rollowing criterion, ll1• P• 21. 
26M:CE, p. 11. 
-27 1•Defence" PP p. 33. _, 
28M:OE, p. 12. 
16 
of external objects. 29 
It is not clear whether or not this second criterion is 
necessary in order to have a common sense statement.30 It is 
tempting to treat the two criteria as being interdependent, since 
compulsive acceptance implies a universal acceptance. That is, 
one is apt to think that a given common sense belief is univer-
sally accepted as true because we cannot help believing it. But 
is this how Moore uses these criteria? According to Moore, to 
say that a given belief is universally accepted actually means 
"commonly or generally" accepted.3l So strict universality is 
not a criterion o~ common sense beliefs. And this implies that 
~t least some common sense beliefs might not be compulsively ac-
~epted. Now the fact that some common sense beliefs have changed 
~rom one era to another,32 and that there is often only general 
~cceptance of these beliefs might be taken as evidence that some 
~ommon sense beliefs are not compulsively accepted. Yet the fact 
~hat some beliefs have changed does not prove that they were not 
~ompulsively accepted as true. 
It would seem, then, to be a fair description of Moore's 
usage to say that the one necessary criterion of common sense 
statements is that they are "commonly accepted as true"; and the 
Reality 
29Moore, "Hume's Philosophy," .£:§, PP• 157, 163-4. 
30M:CE, p. 11. Cf • .!!':!t P• 21. 
31cr. "Defence", ~. p. 44. See also: 
of Objects of Perception, 11 E§, pp. 31, 
32 Cf. SMPP, pp. 3, ?, 8-9, 13. 
-
"The Nature and 
42-3. 
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su.f ficient criterion is thR.t the;y be "compulsively accepted as 
true." 
Does Moore use any other criteria not; mentioned by 1.Jh.i te? 
One possibility would be that all common sense bel5.efs are ex-
pressf'!d in ordinary Janguage.33 However, this does not seem to 
be a distinct or additional criterion, for the notion "commonly 
accepted" seems to imply the notion "expressed in ordinary lan-
er· fl 
0 ua.ge. A sAcond possible criterion would be psychological cer-
ltainty, for "we believe that we do really know" common sense be-
. -
~iefs.34 But again, this seems to be contained in the notion 
"commonly accepted as~·" 
2. Criteria .2! Truth. Although we believe that we know 
-
la given common sense belief, we make a distinct~.on "between 
rthinga which are now absolutely known; things which were formerly 
believed, but believed wrongly; and things which we do not yet 
Know."35 While common acceptance and compulsive acceptance are 
reasons for considering a given common sense belief to be true, 
~either criterion is sufficient to determine its truth. What 
~ther criteria does Moore use to determine whether a given common 
~ense belief is true? White suggests that there are several cri-
teria. 
true 
says 
33E.g., "Defence," PP, pp. 35-6. This assertion seems 
of Moore's practice, tnough it may not be true of what he 
about his practice, ibid., p. 37. 
-34 SMPP, p. 12. 
35 Ibid., p. 1.3. Cf. "Defence," PP, pp. 44-5. 
- -
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(a) The first criterion White suggests in inconsistency-
upon-denial: a given common sense belief is true when it is, some 
now, inconsistent to deny it.36 There are five or six variations 
of this criterion. One type of inconsistency is that of presup-
posing the very common sense belief which one is attempting to 
disprove. For example, 
Any philosopher who asserts positively that other men, 
equally with himself, are incapable of knowing any exter-
nal facts, is, in that very assertion, contradicting him-
self, since he implies that he does kno~ a great many 
facts about the knowledge of ot~men.5? 
Another type of inconsistency is that of basing an argument 
(which denies a common sense statement) on premisses that are 
less certainly true than the common sense statement to be dis-
proved. Consider the following case. 
Russell's view that I do not know for certain that this is 
a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I am right, 
on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I 
don't know these things immediately; (2) That I don't 
follow logicall~ from any thing or things that I do know 
immediately; (3) That, if (1) and (2) are true, my be-
lief in or knowledge of~hem must be 'based on an analo-
gical or inductive argument'; and (4) That what is so 
36EM, p. 22. White refers simply to "inconsistency." 
The fact tnat common sense is "opposed to the paradoxical" seems 
to be an expression of the criterion of inconsistency. Cf. S.A. 
Grave, "Common Sense," The Encyclopedia of Philosophl' Vol. 2, 
ed. by Paul Edwards (Ne'W'"York: Macmillan-;-196?), p. 56. 
3?ttoore, "Hume's Philosophy," PS, p. 158. Cf. also: "De-
fence," PP, pp. 42-3 (quoted on p. 11 aoove); "The Nature and 
Reality Of Objects of Perception," PS, pp. 31-2; SMPP, p. 202. 
White's second type of inconsistency is "where an alleged 
disproof of a common sense belief does not presuppose its truth 
but the truth of the ~ of belief, namely a common sense belief, 
which is being denied."(H:CE, pp. 12-3) This type of inconsis-
tency seems so similar t'O"tlie one just presented that its differ-
~ntiation is unnecessary. 
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based cannot be certain knowledge ••• Is it, in fact, as 
certain that all these four assumptions are true, as that 
I .£2. know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious? 
I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that 
I i!Q. know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, 
than that any single one of these four assumptions is 
true, let alone all four.38 
A third example is the inconsistency of denying the implications 
of common sense beliefs• i.e., of things we know to be true. 
E.g., the proposition that my body has existed for many 
years past, and has, at every moment during that time 
been either in contact with or not far from the earth, 
is a proposition which implies both the reality of mater-
~ things ••• and also the reality .2f Space.3lJ°"" 
Fourthly, it is inconsistent to deny a common sense belief and 
thereby contradict other beliefs which we hold to be true. This 
seems to be part of the naturalistic fallacy: it is inconsistent 
to maintain an identity between 'good' and something else (~), 
and also maintain that it makes sense to ask, "Is x good?u Fin-
-
ally, it is inconsistent, even self-contradictory, to maintain 
that we know certain things "to be features in the Common Sense 
view, and that yet they are not true; since to say that ~ know 
this, is to say that they are true. 1140 This is the special kind 
38Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism," PP, P•' 226. See al-
so: "Hume's Philosophy," PS, p. 160; "Certainty,"~. p. 24?; 
"Some Judgments of Perception," ~. p. 228. 
39"Defence," E_~, pp. 38-9. ,Cf.~. p. 12. 
40Ibid., p. 44. Moore also says of some truisms that "if 
they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether 
we know this or not), it follows that they are true." (p. 45, 
italicized). Malcolm interprets Moore as saying that the propo-
sition "There is a Common Sense view of the world" entails such 
things as "Time is real" and "Space is real." Therefore, if 
there is a common sense view of the world, then the entailea 
propositions are true. "Critical Notice of G. E. Moore: A Criti-
cal Exposition,"~. 69 (1960), pp. 93-4. 
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of inconsistency referred to by White. But as White himself 
notes, this is probably only a particular variation of the first 
type of inconsistency mentioned above; and so it can be ommitted 
as a distinct criterion of truth. 41 To summarize: a common sense 
belief is true when its denial is inconsistent with accepting 
(i) its truth, (ii) a less certain truth, (iii) other things one 
holds to be true; or when (iv) one denies the implications of 
pommon sense beliefs. 
Two comments are in order. First, we need to distinguish 
a logical inconsistency from what might be called existential 
inconsistency. Thus, Moore maintained that it is inconsistent to 
deny a common sense belief because this involves the logical in-
consistency of self-contradiction, or of denying the conclusion 
of a valid syllogism; or because the denial involves the existen-
tial inconsistency of accepting what is less certain, or of ac-
cepting what is incompatible with other beliefs we hold to be 
true. Secondly, both types of inconsistency seem to be related 
to the criterion of compulsive acceptance. Speaking about Hume, 
for example• Moore says: 
He points out, with regard to all such excessively scepti-
cal opinions that we cannot continue to believe them for 
long together--that, at least, we cannot, for long toge- 42 ther, avoid believing things flatly inconsistent with them. 
It would seem, then, that the compulsive character of many common 
41M:CE, p. 14. White believes that this argument is sim-
ilar to an--apj)eal to the paradigm case. (pp. 36-?). 
42Moore, "Hume's Philosophy,".!:§, p. 15?. Emphasis mine. 
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sense beliefs is merely the consequence of the inconsistency 
wbich results when these beliefs are denied. If this is so, then 
inconsistency-upon··denial would be a clearer formulation of the 
criterion wbich is sufficient for having a common sense state-
ment. However, when considering the truth of a common sense be-
lief, the criterion of inconsistency is not sufficient. Like 
the first two criteria, inconsistency-upon-denial may be a reason 
for holding a belief to be true, but it does not prove it to be 
true.43 Nor is there any evidence in Moore's writings to indi-
cate that inconsistency-upon-denial is a necessary condition for 
the truth of a common sense statement. 
(b) We are left, then, with only one criterion of the 
truth of common sense beliefs: self-evidence. The kind of thing 
Moore has in mind when he speaks of something as self-evident is 
our belief that there are "enormous numbers of material objects; 
~nd there are also a very great number of mental acts or acts of 
Consciousness."44 Similarly, it is self-evident that personal 
~ffection is intrinsically good. 45 Now while Moore maintains 
~hat self-evidence is the sole criterion of the truth of a common 
•ense belief, he does not believe that it constitutes a Eroof of 
rthat belief. "If, therefore, anybody asserts ••• that it is 
~vident to him that one and the same action ~ be both right and 
43White agrees that 
four types of inconsistency 
448Mnn 4 ~' P• • 
45~, p. 188. 
this is true for at least the first 
enumerated above (M:CE, p. 14). 
-
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ong, I do not see how it can be proved that he is wrong. 1146 In 
other words, self-evident ~ruths cannot be proved; they can only 
e shown to be true. There are no criteria for self-evidence.47 
or example, there is no evidence that can prove what kinds of 
-hings ought to exist for their own sakes. 48 Thus, for Moore, 
elf-evidence is the sufficient criterion of the truth of common 
beliefs. 
However, Moore did speak aboui, proving some common sense 
He tried to prove, for example, that there is an exter-
al world. 49 But there is no real incompatibility between his 
otions of proof and self-evidence. If someone denies a common 
belief, if he does not see its self-evidence, then all 
could do was attempt to show that it ie somehow inconsis-
ent to deny the common sense belief. He recognized that all his 
"proofs" rested upon an unprovable or self-evident premiss. His 
"proofs'' were an attempt to make one see the self-evident charac-
er of a belief .50 They were not aimed at establishing the truth 
46Ethics, p. 86. Cf. also "The Refutation of Idealism," 
here Moore says: if an idealist asserts that "esse is percipi" 
s self-evident, then Moore can only say that "ttdoes not appear 
o me to be so." (!:§, p. 11). 
47~, pp. 75, 145, 160; Ethics, p. 86; ~. p. 191. 
48~, pp. viii, x. 
49"Proof," ~. p. 149; ~. p. 120; "Reply," ~. PP• 
50"The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception," PS, 
55-6; "Hume's Philosophy," PS, pp. 148-50, 159-60; "PfOOf,' 
P, pp. 148-50; "Defence," PP, pp. Yi, 44; SMPPf pp. 191, 237; 
ics 1 p. 86. But cf. alsO: Murphy, "MoorerB' Defence of Common 
.....,.e"""'n"""s'"'"e- " 
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of common sense beliefs, but at rejecting the denial of tbese be-
liefs. Moore made no clain to logical certainty; he was only 
relatively certain. This is ·;;o say, ffoore was psychologically 
51 certain simply because he found no good reason not to be. 
5l"Certainty," ~' p .. 237, 244. For a brief statet1ent of 
~oore's common sense argument, see V. C. Chappell's example in 
"Malcolm on Moore,"~. 70 ~1961), 420-3. 
CHAPTER III 
COMMON SENSE AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE: AN EVALUATION 
After first reading Moore's works, it is tempting to sim-
ply ask: are his arguments valid? The difficulty is that; one can· 
not answer this question without knowing the "status" of Moore's 
arguments. The debate over this issue centers around the rela-
tionship between common sense and philosophy. The relati.onship 
is obviously one or conflict. Philosophers have denied both the 
l truth of common sense beliefs, and our knowledge of them. But 
are these real conflicts? 
Some philosophers consider the conflict between eommon 
sense and philosophy only an apparent one because the conflict is 
taken to be merely linguistic. Thia is the view we will consider 
in this chapter. 1n effect, then, we will be asking whether an 
~ppeal to common sense is equivalent to an appeal to ordinary 
language. And if there is merely one appeal, is this appeal such 
that it can be interpreted as being either an appeal to common 
sense or as an appeal to ordinary language; or, ia an appeal to 
Pommon sense really a disguised appeal to ordinary language? 
1Moora also mentioned that some philosophers add -to com-
~on dense belie.f's--they say, for exampltl, "Therd is a <fO'd. n How-
~ver, these additions were not particularly disturbing to Moore, 
aince common sense holds no view regarding ·~hese addi tons 11 and so 
~)~ not being contradicted. (SllPP, pp. 2, 16-8; cf. also :pp. 301-
24 
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And if there are two distinct appeals, is one more "basic" than 
the other? 
Since the linguistic interpretation revolves around a 
discussion of ordinary language, we will begin by describing how 
Moore utilized ordinary language. 
A. Moore's References to Ordinary L.angµSY)e 
Moore ref erred to ordinary language for two general rea-
sons: to clarify what he and others meant, and to ascertain whe-
ther what was meant is true or not. 
1. Reflection on Usage: Meani:qs. Often, Moore's refer-
ences to ordinary language were merely reflections upon ordinary 
usage, in order to call attention to how we actually use certain 
expressions. His purpose was simply to be clear about the menni-
of an expression. Yet his reflections upon ordinary usage were 
~ore than practical measures taken in order to be understood. 2 
His efforts at achieving clarity were aimed at avoiding the 
source of philosophical difficulties, which is attempting "to 
answer questions without first discovering precisely what ques-
tions it is which you desire to answer.,.3 
In attempting to clarify philosophical statements, Moore 
used a special technique, called the translation into the con-
crete. This is the technique of spelling out in ordina17 language 
2ar. !:1!.Q!, p. 32; EM, 
233 .. -
pp. 40-1; and Broyl~s, .2J2.• ~., p. 
3pE 
_, p. vii. 
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the implications of a philosophical concept or proposition.4 
How Moore utilized this will be illustrated in the following sec-
ti on. 
Despite Moore's emphasis on clarity, it is worth keeping 
the following observation in mind. 
Moore generally chooses to employ language in a straight-
forward way • • • This is largely based on a considera-
tion of clarity ••• But it is characteristic ot Moore 
to treat the ordinary meaning of expressions as unproble-
matic. He holds that there obviously is an ordinary use (or several), that we all know perfectly well what it is (or they are;, and that it would be foolish not to follow 
it (or them). No great issues are seen to hinge upon the 
ordinary use of language. Moore's faith in ordinary lan-
guage might almost be described as precritical. It fore-
shadows none of the coming "wars•t over the status, the 
character, the legitimacy of the appeal to ordinary lan-
guage.5 
Th.is serves to remind us that Moore did not give an extended 
treatment of the questions raised in this chapter. 
2. Appeal to Usage: Truth. At times, Moore not only re-
flected upon ordinary language, but actually appealed to it. In 
these situations, he was not only interested in the meaning of an 
~ssertion, but more especially in its truth. His appeals to or-
dinary language served two purposes. The first was a construc-
tive appeal to what people commonly say, as indicative of what 
~hey believe. In this way, ordinary language is something like a 
guide to what is commonly, and perhaps compulsively, accepted--a 
4
sMPP, PP• 29-30, 135; "The Conception of Reality," E!h 
P• 209. I 
P• 36. 
~royles, .21?.• ill.•, P• 234. Of., e.g., "Defence t" ?Et 
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guide to common sense beliefs. 6 For example: 
We constantly speak as if there were cases in which a 
given thing was true on one occasion and false on another; 
and I think it cannot be denied that, when we so speak, 
we are often expressing in a perfectly proper and legi-
timate manner something which is undoubtedly true.? 
Appeals to ordinary language not only reveal common sense 
beliefs; they also reveal weaknesses in some philosophical posi-
tions, and thus serve a destructive purpose. Once Moore had 
clarified a particular philosophical assertion by translating it 
into the concrete, he was often able to show that it was self-
contradictory. 8 And if someone were to object that Moore's tran-
slation was not what the assertion really meant, tr1en Moore had 
at least shown that the statement was not really paradoxical, 
and therefore was not really as important as it seemed before-
hand. 9 And finally, Moore's technique enabled him to show that 
a given philosophical assertion actually does conflict with com-
~on sense, in which case it was vulnerable to Moore's appeal to 
common sense. 
6cr. M:CE, p. 32; !!'.'.!• pp. 42-3. Broyles overlooks this 
type of appear:--
7 "William James' 'Pragmatism,'" PS, p. 133. Cf. also 
"The Refutation of Idealism," PS, PP• 19~0; "Some Judgments of 
Perception," PS, p. 226; SMPP,pp. ?, 311; "The Subject Matter of 
Psychology," l5roc. Arist.~., 10 (1909), p. 41; "Is Ex:istence 
a Predicate?" f.~, pp. 118-9; "Symposium: Indirect Knowledge," 
Arist. Soc., Suppl • .!21.• 9 (1929), pp. 27-9. 
,gPE, p. 99; "Four Forms of Scepticism," 
"Defence,,,-PP, pp. 42-3, quoted on p. 11 above. 
9"Defence," PP, p. 39; SMPP, p. 204. 
- -
PP, pp. 208-10; 
-
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Consider, for example, how Moore dealt with Hume's Eeep-
ticism. Moore granted that: ".!!.Hume's principles are true, no-
body can ever E1.9!. of the existence of any material objects."lO 
Moore then translates this assertion into a concrete one, and 
proceeds to refute it. 
If Hume's principles are true, then, I have admitted, I 
do not know now that this pencil--the material object--
exis:tS'. If ,~erefore, I am to prove that I ,9:.2 know that 
this pencil exists, I must prove, somehow, that Hume's 
principles, one or both of them, are not true. In what 
sort of way, by what sort of argument-;-'Can I prove this? 
It seems to me that, in fact, there really is no 
stronger and better argument than the following. I do 
know that this pencil exists; but I could not know thrs, 
if Hume's principles were true; therefotI' Hume's prin-
ciples, one or both of them, are false. 
This example serves to illustrate that Moore's ultimate 
appeal was to common sense, not to ordinary language. However, 
it also illustrates the peculiar situation in which Moore seems 
to be caught when he appeals to common sense. His reply seems to 
be obviously true. Yet he cannot convince his opponent, for his 
argument begs the question. 
One solution to this predicament is to reinterpret just 
what is the question under discussion. For !! there is only a 
linguistic disagreement, then Moore does not beg the question. 
-
L.Je will now consider this interpretation o:f the conflict between 
common sense and philosl°1phy. 
lOSMPP, p. 119. 
-
11sMPP p. 119-20. _, 
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B. The RP.ductive· Thesis 
According to the reductive thesis, the disagreement be-
tween common sense and philosophy is not .factual; it is linguis-
.:E:.£• When Moore thought he was refuting a factual absurdity, he 
was simply pointing out a logical absurdity. Thus, Moore's so-
called appeals to common sense a~e really disguised appeals to 
o~dinary language. Here is a brief .formulation of the reductive 
thesis by Norman Malcolm. 
~~an a philosopher maintains that we do not know material 
object propositions to be true (Hume) or that we do not 
see material things (Prichard), he must be holding that 
the notions of knowing a material object proposition to 
be t;rue and of seeing a material thing are really self-
contradictory. He certainly cannot be maintaining-rfiat 
It is a matter of experience that people do not kn.ow or 
see such things. He must be trying to state what he 
thinks is an a priori truth. He must be claiming, perhaps 
without fully realising it, that ordinary sentences like 
''I know that that thing sticking up in the garden is a 
shovel," "I see your glasses under the bed,n are self-
contradictory. To understand that this claim is mistaken 
it is su.fficient to realize that those sentences do have 
a correct use in ordinary discourse, which they cculd not 
have if they were self-contradictory. The important func-
tion of I1oore • s rebuttal was simply to remind us of this 
fact • • • He was not begging the question against Hume 
or Prichard because his very point was that it is really 
not open to question that such sentences have a correct 
use. On my view then, Moore's so-called defence of common 
sense, in so far as it is an interesting and tenable phil-
osophical position, has nothim:; to d.o either w:l. th common 
sense, properly speaking, nor common belief, but is merely 
the assertion, in regard to various sentencGs, that those 
sentences have a correct use in ordinury language.12 
We will now consider a lengthier statement of the reduc-
tive thesis by Alice Ambrose, followed by Moore's response, and 
12Norman Malcolm "Critical Notice o:f. G. E. Moore: A Cri-
tical Exposition." l1ind, 69 (1960), p. 97. 
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some comments. 
1. Example: External Objects. Moore was quite certain 
that there is an external world. And after analyzing what this 
meant, he thought it was quite easy to prove his point. However, 
according to the reductive thesis: (a) Moore's proof of an exter-
nal world ~ not establish the truth of an empirical proposi-
tion; (b) Moore's technique could not establish the truth of an 
empirical proposition of this sort; and (c) once the problem is 
clearly formulated, it is evident that Moore was defending ordi-
nary language, and not common sense. These are the main points 
made by Alice Ambrose in her critique of Moore. 13 
(a) Ambrose begins by observing: 
Prof. Moore considers the proposition, "There are exter-
nal objects," to be an empirical one. It follows from a 
proposition which is established by empirical evidence, 
viz., the evidence of the senses. One has merely to show 
two hands and one has established that there are external 
objects.14 
As Moore himself recognized, the sceptic would not be satisfied 
with this proof. 
If the existence of external objects is in question, then 
calling attention to a visual experience-no ai?ferent in 
important respects from many past experiences which the 
sceptic has precluded from constituting proof will not 
convince him.15 
That is, what the sceptic requires is a proof of the premiss, 
"Here is a hand." This is why Moore's argument does not convince 
-
l.5Alice Ambrose, ''Moore's Proof of an External World," 
~. pp. 397-41?. 
14Ibid., p. 398. 
-
l5Ibid., p. 405. 
i 
'I 
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the sceptic of the empirical proposition "There are external 
objects." 
(b) Moreover, Moore cannot prove this proposition. To 
"point out" something is to distinguish it from other things. 
But one cannot point out anything which is .!12.! an external object. 
Therefore, it is impossible to prove that "There are external 
objects" by pointing out an external object. Nor is the proposi-
tion "Th.ere is an external object" entailed by a proposition such 
as "There is a dime." That is, the proposition regarding exter-
nal objects cannot be established even indirectly. 
not 
that 
that 
Holding "A dime is an external object" expresses a neces-
sary proposition does not entail holding that anything 
which is a dime satisfies all the criteria tor applying 
the phrase "external object." For this phrase is not used 
to apply to any kind of thing. One will therefore not 
have established the existence of any tging of the kind 
"external objectn in producing a dime.l 
Aside from this, there is a second reason why Moore can-
prove his point. For there is a catch in the sceptic's claim 
no one can know that external objects exist. The catch is 
"no possible amount of further evidence would alter the 
sceptic's claim about the limitations of our kn owl edge. ,,l? This 
shows that the sceptic's claim is unfalsiriable, and hence, is 
not an empirical proposition at all. 
lated. 
(c) This indicates that the problem needs to be reformu-
16Ibid., p. 408. 
l?Ibid., p. 399. 
-
I! 
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When the sceptic says no one can know that external 
objects exist, he cannot describe what prevents him from 
knowing, what obstacle stands in his way. Nor can he des-
cribe what kind of thing he would need to know in order 
for evidence for the existence of external objects to ~e 
complete. He cannot because he wants to say that there 
a~e no describable circumstances in which anyone c"O'UI'U be 
said to kriow that external objects exist. This comes to 
saying that "no one knows external objects exist" cannot 
be falsified, that is, that it i~ not an empirical asser-
tion about our ability to know.l 
-
Thus, "the scep'l:iic is arguing for the logical impossibility of 
knowledge and not for any empirical fact."19 Yet this seems un-
reasonable, for it implies that such statements as "I know there 
is a dollar in my purse" are logically impossible. The sceptic's 
argument is not about empirical matters, and is in such marked 
opposition to the way we ordinarily speak that he must actually 
be "making a disguised proposal. 1120 That is, he is proposing 
that such statements as "No one knows the existence of hands" 
should be accepted as necessarily true. Thus, what appeared to 
18Ibid., p. 402. 
-
l9Ibid. 
-20Lazerowitz offers two additional arguments for this in-
terpretation. Moore summarized these, and replied as follows. 
"He [Lazerowitz1 says that i.f they did mean anything more by them 
than this, we should have to suppose that they held sincerely 
views which they knew to be .false; and that this is impossible ••• 
To this, I should reply that he is right in saying that we should 
nave to suppose that they held sincerely views which they knew to 
be .false; but that there is no reason whatever to suppose that 
this is impossible--nor does he even try to give any. And he 
points out (b) that philosophers in these cases, 'counter facts 
with arguments;' that they cannot, by (a), both know the .facts 
and regard their arguments as correct arguments against them; 
that there.fore they plainly want us to look at the arguments ra-
ther than the facts; and, therefore, their arguments are merely 
meant to back a verbal recommendation. The last 'taerefore' 
seem~~to me to be a simply enormous non-sequitur!" CReply," ~. 
n. 61::J). 
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be a real conflict about factual matters is actually a conflict 
over how we should speak. 
Now if the sceptic is not really questioning an em~irical 
proposition when he says "No one knows the existence of external 
things," then what was Moore really doing when he replied to the 
sceptic? 
Moore's statement that '"There iJs a hand• entails 'There 
is an external object'" calls attention to criteria for 
applying "external object words" • • • [He] calls atten-
tion to criteria for the use of such words as "hand," 
"dime,u and the like, and in doing this shows that in Eng-
lish it makes sense to say "I know there is a dime in the 
box." That is, Moore's argument (although it does not 
establish the truth of an empirical proposition about the 
existence of a kind of thing, external objects) has as a 
consequence that it is lo5icallt possible to know there 
are coins in a box. We recall hat ~he sceptic argued as 
if it were logically impossible.21 
Thus, Moore was actually resistin~ a lin~uistic recommendation 
and "insisting on retaining conventions already established in 
22 
the language about the usage of the words 'know' and 'believe'." 
Moore was simply pointing to ordinary usage to show "that the 
sceptic's linguistic recommendation is objectionable. 1123 
2. Moore's Response. In his reply, Moore tries to cor-
rect four errors in Ambrose's critique. 
(a) First of all, Moore believed that one can prove that 
external objects exist. To say that such a proof is impossible 
because one cannot "point to" anything which is not an external 
21Ibid., pp. 409-10. 
22Ibid., p. 415. 
-23Ibid., p. 411. 
~18RAHY / 
object is not a valid argument, unless "point to" means only 
"point with the finger at." 
34 
One can point out to a person an object which is not an 
external object ••• You can say to him: "Look a~ 
bright light for a little while; then close your eyes; 
the round blue patch you will then see is not an external 
object." ••• And it seems to me that the contrast with 
objects Qf this sort enters into the meaning of "external 
object. 11 24 
(b) Next, Moore beli~ved that "There are external objects" 
is an empirical proposition. Ambrose aret1es that this is not an 
empirical proposition because "no possible amount of further evi-
dence would alter the sceptic's claim." Moore replied: 
This argument is a good reason for saying that his reason 
for denying external objects is not an empirical one • • • 
But he is, of course, wrong in thinking that "There are 
external objects" is self-contradictory, and, if so, 
"There are externalobjects'' may really be an empirical 
statement. It seems to me that !;r statement, that there 
~· certainly is empirical. WhY should it not be the 
cas~ that from 11Ts false non-empirical statement that 
"There are external objects" is self-contradictory, the 
philosopher invalidly infers the empirical statement 
"There are no external objects?" This seems to me to be 
what has actually happened.25 
(c) From these two replies, it would seem the.t Moore was 
attempting to defend a common sense position. Ambrose objects: 
since our language is used in such a way that "I know that there 
is a dollar in my pursen describes what could be the case, the 
sceptic is B2.i asserting the non-empirical proposition that such 
2411Reply," ~' P• 671. 
25 11Reply," PG.EM, pp. 671-2. Cf. also: CB, pp. 11?, 202. 
In commenting on Moore's reply, Ambrose seems t'O"misinterpret 
what Moore saiG.. ("Three Aspects of Moore's Philosophy," Ess~s 
~ Analysis, pp. 208-9). 
35 
assertions are self-contradictory; therefore, he is making a lin-
guistic recommendation. Moore replied: "though he knows that 
such language is often used, yet he is not aware that it ever 
-
describes what could be the case. 1126 
(d) Finally, Moore expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
reductive thesis as an interpretation of his arguments. "I could 
not have supposed that the fact that I had a hand proved anything 
as to how the expression 'external objects' ought to be used. 1127 
If he was merely making a recommendation that we should not use 
certain expressions in a way which deviates from ordinary usage--
"If this is all I was doing, I was certainly making a huge mis-
take, for I certainly did not think it was all. And I do not 
think so now. 1128 An appeal to ordinary language was not satis-
factory for Moore's purpose. 
A man may be using a sentence perfectly correctly, even 
when what he means by it is false, either because he is 
lying or because he is making a mistake; and, similarly, 
a man may be using a sentence in such a way that what 
he means by it is true, even when he is not using it cor-
rectly, as, for instance, when he uses the wrong word for 
what he means, by a slip or because he has made a mistake 
as to what the correct usage is. Thus making a sentence 
correctly--in the sense explained--and using it in such a 
way that what you mean by it is true, are two things which 
are completely logically indepencrent' of one another: either 
may occur without the other.29 
260Reply," PGEM, p. 673. Cf. V. C. Chappell, "Malcolm on 
Moore,"~' 70 (1~, 419-20. 
27uReply " PGEM 
'-· 
p. 674. 
28Ibid., p. 675. Cf. also: CB, pp. 196-7. 
- -29Ibid., p. 548. Cf. also: PE, pp. 6, 12. 
-
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Moore's reply gives a fairly clear indication of his reac 
tion to the reductive thesis. It would seem that Moore considers 
the conflict between common sense and philosophy a real one, and 
not simply a verbal conflict. In other words, (1) an appeal to 
common sense is (or could be) adequate to refute a philosophical 
assertion, whereas an appeal to ordinary language is not adequate; 
therefore (ii) an appeal to common sense is not equivalent to an 
appeal to ordinary language, which is to say, an appeal to common 
sense is not a disguised, linguistic recommendation.30 
3. Comments. This section contains some remarks on 
three topics: an alternative to the reductive thesis, Moore's 
reply to Ambrose, and the reductive thesis. 
(a) Some commentators have held that what Moore did could 
interpreted as defending either common sense or ordinary lan-
Ambrose, for example, says: "Either interpretation is 
lausibly supported by placing different constructions on the 
Moore made use of, namely, analysis."3l This is sur-
for Ambrose devotes so much attention to the ordinary 
interpretation, without in any way indicating how a com-
on sense interpretation could make sense. James Broyles also 
that "the appeals are in essence the same."32 However, 
Cf. EM, PP• 31-9. 
-
31Alice Ambrose, "Three Aspects of Moore's Philosophy," 
sa s in Anal sis, p. 205. Later, Ambrose adds: "It seems to me 
a oore s re u ations • • • are much more convincing when tak-
n as ar~ents whose im~ort is iinguistic than when taken as de-
ending a factual truth. (p. 213;. For examples of this in np-
eration, cf. Lazerowitz. "Moore and Philosophical Analysis," SPM, 
p. 229,3~31. . -
Bro les o • c 
\ 
3? 
he only indicates how "these are not independent techniques"--
which is an entirely different issue. Since no substantial argu-
ment has been offered in behalf of the identity of these appeals, 
we can rest with the summary statement of Moore's position: an 
appeal to common sense is not equivalent to an appeal to ordinary 
language. 
{b) Now we can turn to Moore's reply to Ambrose. It 
seems that three of his arguments are adequate for refuting Am-
brose' a position; or, at least they are adequate .!! he is correct 
in maintaining that "There are external objects" is an empirical 
proposition. Moore believed that this proposition could be under~ 
stood as either an empirical or non-empirical assertion.33 It 
can be treated as an empirical proposition insofar as it is sup-
ported by evidence of our senses. For example, a sceptic might 
argue that since some sensory experiences are s~milar in impor-
tant respects to dream-images, it follows that all sensory exper-
iences one is now having may be mere dream-images.34 Moore would 
reply that such a premiss implies that the sceptic knows that 
dreams have occurred. And so the sceptic is inconsistent. The 
sceptic might grant that we cannot always be wrong; he can still 
maintain that we are unable to identify those cases in which we 
are correct, in which we do know. In reply, Moore resorts to 
- -
33cf. "Reply," PGEM, p. 6?3. 
-
34 "Certainty, 11 Ef, p. 248. This is one kind of argument 
for scepticism. 
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self-evidence. 
If he does not know that he is not dreaming, can he pos-
sibly know that he is ~ only dreaming that dreams 
have occurred? Can he possibly know therefore that 
dreams have occurred? I do not think that he can.35 
-
Elsewhere, Moore points out that the issue is an empirical one 
because there is evidence which can falsify his claim to know, 
--:-
for example, that he is seeing a table. "That I am seeing one," 
he says, "needs no proof to me. If someone were to come & fail 
to see one, that would be a reason for me to doubt. 1136 
For Moore, then, the real conflict between common sense 
and philosophy (at least in this case) has to do with the P.Vi-
dence for each. The lack of proof for self-evident statements 
may be unsatisfactory as far e.s the sceptic is concerned. But 
for Moore, such unprovable truths are necessary for all reason-
ing. Even the sceptic claims to know things by means of ar w ..rner:~ 
But all arguments are based on reasons which support it; all rea-
soning (mediate inference) depends upon judgments (immediate in-
ference). Therefore, if we know anything by means of arguments, 
there must be something which is self-evident--otherwise there 
would be an infinite regress in our reasoning.3? 
However, it is important to realize that Moore knew his 
arguments begged the question, insofar as the question is non-em-
pirical. He says, for example: "Now I cannot see my way to deny 
above. 
35°certainty, 11 
36~, p. 11?. 
3?sMPP, P• 121; 
PP, p. 249. 
-
"Proof," .ff, pp. 146, 149-50. See p. 22 
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~hat it is logically possible that all the sensory experiences I 
~having now should be mere dream-images. 0 38 The surprising re-
sult is that Moore appears to agree with the sceptic, at least 
insofar as they are talking about a non-empirical proposition.39 
The following seems applicable to Moore, as well as Reid. 
Sir James Mackintosh remarks that he observed to Dr. Brown 
in 1812 that Reid and Hume 'differed more in words than in 
opinion.• Brown answered: 'Yes, Reid bawled out, We must 
believe an outward world; but added in a whisper, We can 
give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out, We can 
give no reason for such a notion; and whispers- I own we 
cannot get rid o~ it.'40 
Why, then, did Moore seem so perturbed by scepticism? Simply be-
~ause he believed that there are times when it is absurd to be-
lieve that what is logically possible (viz., an error) is actu-
ally the case.41 He was anxious to point out that because it is 
logically possible for ~ to be something else does not in itself 
imply that I do not know ~· The logical possibility that I may 
oe dreaming is no evidence that I!! dreaming.42 Moore's exampl~ 
nowever, is not adequate. For a sceptic would likely grant that 
. 38 "Certainty," PP, p. 250. Th.is is a second kind of ar-
gument for scepticism: I'Ogical possibility. 
39Notice how Moore, like Hume, defines 'know for certain' 
so that to say "I know for certain that .E." implies ".E"• ("Cer-
tainty," EE, p. 238.) 
40James Mackintosh• Dissertation on the Progress of Ethi-
cal Philosounv. 2d ed. (Edinburg, 1A3?), p. 346. Quoted by S. 
iA. Grave, Tne Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1966), p. 109. 
4111certainty," PP, p. 231. 
-
42cr. Philip P. Wiener, "Philoso:phical, Scientific, and 
Ordinary Language," J. Philos., 45 (1948) 9 260-?. ! i 
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one can be directly aware of his states of mind, and so can know 
these things. The problem that the sceptic emphasizes is that we 
are not directll aware of material objects. In a way, the scep-
tic is simply a disenchanted direct or new realist. But Moore 
does not adhere to direct realism either, which implies that he 
believed that indirect knowledge (or, a representative theory of 
perception) does not prohibit one from knowing empirical facts. 
(c) We can turn now from Moore's view to that of the lin-
guist. Perhaps it would be helpful to state the reductive thesis 
in more linguistic terminology, such as the following. 
rsome philosophers claimJ that certain ordinary ways ot 
talking had always to issue in false statements, no mat-
ter how the facts of the particular ease might vary • • • 
that a considerable body of ordina{l langu.ase is incor-
rect Aamf¥age, in the sense that i can never be used in 
!he norma c!roumstances of its use to make true asser-
tions.43 
Thus, the reductive thesis, when stated linguistically, is simply 
a reminder that ordinary language cannot be incorrect language. 
However, several problems arise with this interpretation 
o! philosophical assertions. First of all, the linguistic inter-
pretation goes beyond pointing out that various philosophical 
statements are non-empirical. Notice, for example, how Ambrose 
continues this kind of interpretation. 
It is hard to suppose the sceptic is arguing that such 
rnon-empiricalJ propositions are necessarily true when 
It is plain that as language is ordinarily used they 
are not.44 
4
'Richard G. Benson, "Ordinary Language, Common Sease, and 
the 1'1.me-Lag Argument," ~ (196?), p. 28. Emphasis added. 
P• 402. 
44
.Ambrose, "Moore's Proof of an External World," PGEM, 
I i I 
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Consider the statement • • • "The sceptic argues as i.f 
'no one knows that hands exist' exuresses a necessary 
~ro~osition." Thi3 is to argue as if "knowing hands ex-
ist had no application • • • The sceptic knows that 
"knowing hands exist" has use, and that "no one knows 
there are hands in the world" is used to express something 
which can be either true or falde. He is holding that 
they should not be so used, only he does not say so expli-
citly.45 -
The mistake that Ambrose makes is to ignore the .fact that "know-
ing hands exist" does not have an ordinary use, when 'knowing' 
has the implication of "necessarily true." In other words, the 
sceptic is per.fectly correct in claiming that "knowing hands 
exist" can have no application in ordinary language, because in 
-
ordinary language, 'knowing' does !!21 imply "necessarily true." 
The philosopher, in other words, would distinguish 'cor-
rect use' in the sense of 'use in accordance with the 
rules o.f ordinary language' from 'correct use' in the 
sense of 'use to make true statements', and would claim 
that a sentence could have a correct use in the first of 
these two senses without having a correct use in the 
second. Moore indicates that he thinks the philosopher 
is justified both in distinguishing these two senses and 
in claiming what he does about their relationship. Mal-
colm, on the other hand, [like other linguists] denies 
that this distinction can be made, or at any rate denies 
that a sentence can be correct in the first sense without 
being correct in the second.46 
Therefore, it does ~ .follow that the sceptic is necessarily 
$ayi:ug how we should speak or use the word 'know•--though he 
might wish to do this. As Moore was regarded as mistakenly 
~hinking that a sceptic was speaking about matters of fact, so 
~he linguist mistakenly thinks that the sceptic is speaking in 
45Ibia., pp. 403-4. 
46v. c. Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore,"~. ?O (1961), 
p. 419. 
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ordinary language, or has to. The linguist overlooks that ordi-
nary language is used in vario~s contexts, in various spheres or 
levels of discourse. 
The linguist is bound to reply: ordinary language cannot 
be incorrect language. But this is no valid objection against 
the sceptic's position. As I stated it above, I gave the impres-
sion that the philosopher is not speaking in ordinary language. 
This is only partly true. Por the sceptic could very easily use 
ordinary language to state his position. He might say: "In ordi-
~ary language, we say that we 'know• external objects or empiri-
cal facts. But we also say, in ordinary language, that it is im-
possible to prove that a particular case of knowing is necessari-
ly true. (The very accusation that Moore had begged the question 
is evidence of this). Therefore, in ordinary language we use 
'know• without regard tor logical possibility." It is important 
to notice that this argument is also directed against Moore's 
position. For Moore•s argument is stated in ordinary language: 
we know empirical statements in the ordinary sense ot 'know.• 
However, if--as the sceptic claims--the ordinary sense ot 'know' 
does not include the notion of certainty; then Moore's argument 
is completely ineffective against scepticism.47 
A second difficulty with the linguistic interpretation is 
that the appeal to ordinary language seems to be based on the 
47ct. A. c. Ewing, "Knowledge of Physical Objects," in 
Non-Limruistic Philosoptq (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), 
P• o-'• 
JI 
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principle of verification,48 according to which all cognitively 
11eanine;ful proposi~.:;ions are either a'l'lalytic or empirical, and 
those ilhich Fl.re empirical have cognitive meaning only if they ad-
mit of some evidence for or against thelli. But the assumption of 
this analytic-synthetic dichotomy is at least debatable. 49 And 
it is important to keep this in mind, for it is by means of this 
rigid classification that metaphysical assertions are ruled out 
as possib1y having CO{jnitive meaning. Because of this dichotomy, 
we have been restric+.ed ~o considering the conflict between com-
t mon sense and philosophy as either empirical or linguistic. The 
possibility of a third alternative, or a real, metaphysical con-
flict has been ruled out.50 
The issue might be put this way: "Is the significance of 
the language of common sense exhausted when it has been used with 
reference to what can fall unde::::- the sense and (the speaker's) 
introspection, or does it go beyond this to what these cannot 
48Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the ap-
peal to ordinary language is based on "methodological verifica-
tionism, 11 or "methodological nominaliam,rr which does not commit 
one to the truth of the principle of verification. On a ciffi-
cul ty with this position, cf. Ewing,~·£!!., p. 68. 
49As Moore said, to maintain that metaphysical statements 
have no meaning requires identifying these statements by the kind 
of meaning they have, which iR the meaning of asserting something 
unverifiable. (Cited by Alice Ambrose, Essa.ys in Anal;zsis, p. 
207). On the pJ'inciplo of verification• cf. Carl G. Hempel, 
"Problemc and Changes in tbe Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," 
Rev. Intern. J>hilos.·, (1950), pp. 41-63. 
50Lazerowitz contends that even if there are synthetic 
a priori judgments, this type of knowledge does not help solve 
the problem. ("Moore and Philosophical Analysis, 11 S?M, p. 243). 
-
,, 
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reach?''5l Or we might ask: do common sense beliefs contain a 
trans-crapirical content? 
51 Grave. -212• .£!!., p. 101. 
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CHAP.rER IV 
COMMON SEISE AND ANALYSIS 
So tar, we have considered a tew aspects of Moore's no-
common sense, and the relation between common sense and 
!he notion or common sense remains problema-
ic, and the relation between comm.on sense and ordinary language 
as not even been adequately stated, much less resolved. !':bus, 
t has been impossible to proceed to the more important question: 
as Moore successful in his attempts to defend common sense? 
erhaps by considering this issue more directly, it will be easi-
r to clarity Moore's notion ot common sense--which is the main 
onoern or this paper. 
When the question of the validity or Moore's arguments is 
a common reply is that they are valid on the level or 
sense, but irrelevant on the philosophical level. As 
emke says: 
In one sense, we understand what it is for tables and 
chairs to exist, and, in that sense, we know that there 
are such objects • • • However, in another sense, and in 
a different context, might one not plausibly hold that 
it is sometimes appropriate to question various common-
sense assertions, since we know, among other things, that 
common sense is often wrong (Moore admits the latter)? 
• • • I might suggest, tor example, that I am now sensing 
a red datum which is wholly presented to me is absolutely 
certain. But I might wonder whether, in this same sense, 
it is absolutely certain that there is a red book on that 
table over there. Might I not tind that the 'GOOi is 
orange, or that the object is a box and not a book, or 
that there is, in tact. no object over there at all?l 
In etfect, Klemke accuses Moore of overlooking that, on the phil-
osophical level, one is attempting an analysis ot common sense 
statements,2 which gives rise to technical terms. In other words 
Moore is accused of ignoring the fact that words like 'know• and 
'exist' are used in a special sense on the philosophical level. 
Therefore, his arguments miss their metaphysical and epistemolog-
ical targets.3 
Thus, we have not yet finished considering the relevance 
of ordinary language. Now we take it up again in a somewhat dif-
ferent context, that of analysis. Roughly speaking, whereas the 
last chapter centered around the truth of common sense proposi-
tions, the present chapter picks up this problem in terms of !!,!!-
nin&:e. 
Moore's position is this. 
It is ;eossible to understand (common sense1 statements 
about L.•uoh things asJ observed material ol>jects and other 
selves, in their ordinary or popular meaning, and to know 
their truth tor certain, without knowing what their cor-
rect analysis is.4 
lnemke, EM, P• 19c ct., PP• 20.t 26-30. See also Malcolm 
"Defending Oommon-Wense•, .§E!11 PP• 203-·1, 215-81 and Barnes, ~e 
PhilosoDhical Predicament, P• 42. 
2~., p. 30. See also l"'furpb.y, "Moore's 'Defence ot Com• 
mon Sense , ~. PP• 303, 308•9. 
3Moore denied this charge and maintained that he was (at 
least operatively) aware of this distinction. ("Reply", PG.EM, 
PP• 668-70• Ot., e.g. 1 "Ob~ecta of Perception", PS, P• 6~; 
"Proof", PP, pp. 141-2 J. -
-
4MurpbJr, .2.R• oit. 1 p. 310. See Moore's "Defence", PP, PP• 36-7. Is thispaicr-or the reason why Moore spoke of common 
sense "beliefs", and not "knowledge"? 
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Now there is no real conflict between 11oore•s position 
d that of the epistemologist, as long as the latter does not 
extend the technical meaning of 'know•, tor example, so as to in-
lude its ordinary or common sense meaning. However, when a 
echnieal, philosophical term is used so as to include its comm.on 
ense meaning, and when this results in a conflict between a 
hilosophieal assertion and common sense--then Moore's defense of 
ommon sense is at least relevant, it not conclusive.5 As .A';rer 
aid: "the philosopher has no right to despise the beliefs ot com 
on sense • • • What he is entitled to despise is (onlyJ the un-
etlecting analysis ot those beliets."6 
The crux ot the issue seems to be the meaning of •to 
ow•. For Moore, to know something does not imply knowing its 
alysis. For other philosophers, it does.? However, there are 
till others who agree with Moore's position, but rejeot his 
tatement ot the issue. It is this latter disagreement that we 
11 consider in what follows. 
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that Moore's notion 
t analysis implies that while common sense is the starting point 
t philosophy, it ia not the limit ot philosophy. For "the first 
d most important problem ot philosophy is: ~o give a general 
5Mu.rphy, tor one, believes that in this situation, H:>ore•s 
guments are conclusive. <Jlla• ,g!!., PP• 312-3). 
6
.A. J. Ayer, La.nsuase, ~uth !as! Logic. 2d ed. London, 
P• 51. 
?Barnes, ll• .2!!•• P• 32. 
I . 
48 
iescription ot the whole Universe."8 
For Moore. as tor others, understanding Oommon-sense 
statements and knowing them to be true is not enough. A 
common-sense philosopher is not one who remains at the 
level ot Common Sense. His quest is tor knowledge which 
penetrates .further into the nature of things than unaided 
Oommon Sense is able to.9 
A. What Js Analysis? 
When Moore said that he knew a particular common sense 
statement to be true and yet did not know its analysis, he was 
distinguishing two difterent types of meaning that an expression 
may have: its ordinary meaning• and a technical kind of meaning. 
Analysis is a Aomewhat technical term tor a specific kind of 
meaning. In an effort to clarity this notion, we will first dis-
rtingulsh analysis from other kinds 0:£ meaning, and then consider 
what it is that is analysed, and finally, how it is analysed. 
l. Xinds of Meaning. .An expression or statement may 
~ave several different types ot meaning.lo First ot all, the 
meaning of an expression may be its sense !!.!, ordina..:::r t!BS'!8-6e• 
A vivid example is found in Moore's lectures. 
Who is there who does not know what is meant by saying 
that some men are alive and others dead, ~utticiently 
8 SHPP, P• 2. 
-
9Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore and Philosophical .Analysis", 
SPM, P• 232. 
1010.emke notes that Moore also used 4meaning' in the 
sense 0£ (i) 'im.portance•-as in, "!bat was a meaningless gesture" 
-and in the sense of (ii) emotive meaning. ht these two uses 
have little meaning tor philosophy. (Jr:!1 PP• 53-4). 
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well to be able to say with certainty in ever so many 
cases that some men are alive and others are dead? But 
yet, if you try to de?!ne the meaning ot ilie word 'lite• 
quite generally--to give an account of the difference 
between lite and death, which will apply to all cases in 
which we sa:y that one thing is alive and another dead, 
you will certainly find it extraordinarily difficult. 
The very same person who may know quite well that one 
particular man is alive and another dead, may yet be quite 
unable to say exactly what properties there are which are 
common to a living man and to all other living things--a 
living plant, a living cell; a living bacillus, and which 
at the same time do not belong to a dead man or to any-
thing not living. Vi!I, in the same way, it seems to me 
we do usually understand quite well the meaning ot these 
much more fundamental expressions 'real', •exists•, 'is'• 
'is a tact•, 'is true• ••• even though we do not know 
their meaning, in the sense or being able to define c1.e., 
give an analysis otJ thea.11 
econdly, the meaning of an expression may be its use. "Often, 
e are not only able to lunder•tand an expression • • • but we are 
so able to use the expression intelligently or in accord with 
ommon usage."12 And when someone consistently uses an expres• 
ion correctly, we could say that he knows the meaning of that 
Thirdly, the meaning ot an expression :might be its 
erbal definition. Tb.us, one could speak of the meaning ot 
'horse• as being "a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equusn.13 
ourthly, the meaning of an expression could be its referent, 
the object or concept to which an expre&sion refers.14 For 
llHoore• SMPPt PP• 205-6. 
12nelilke, ~· P• .56· ~s distinction between "sense in 
ordinary language• and •use" is made by Klemke. It is very doubt 
ul, however, whether Moore made this distinction. (Of. "Neces-
sity", Mind, PP• 289-90; !I· P• 6; ~. PP• 205-6, 216-?; "De-
enoe", a>, PP• 19?-8; "Reply", PGJIJ;P. 548) Whether or not 
his distI'nction is made does no~ seem important here. 
l3Moore, E!t P• B. 
14While Moore reco at times I 
I 
I 
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example, the meaning of 'good' is the object or idea which the 
word stands ror.15 
2. The "Anal:sandum". 7or all four ot the kinds ot 
meanings mentioned, what is to be analyzed (the anal:sandum) is 
an expression or statement. This is not the case in analysis. 
Rather, what is to be analyzed is a concept or object. As Moore 
said in his "Reply": 
I never intended to use the word ['analysis'J in such a 
way that the analisandum would be a verbal hi\ression. 
When I have ta!ite of analysing anytFllng, "w I have 
talked or analysing has always been an idea or concept 
or proposition, and not a verbal expression.16 
-
Unfortunately, Moore did noi always speak so unequivocally and 
clearly. !hue he did, at times, speak ot analyzing words or expres-
sions .17 But this seems to have been simply a misleading way ot 
be equivalent to •use•, he usually spoke ot meaning in terms ot 
naming. It is possible that the distinction between the two was 
unclear to him. (See his "Repl7", where (p • .583) he equates ·the 
"dirterent senses in which the word 'good' is used" and the "dif-
ferent characteristics or which it is a name"). Soaetiaes Moore 
thought that what was named or referred to was an obieot, while 
at other times the referent was taken to be a concep • ~or a 
dis~ussion or Moore's naming theory ot meaning• see Ohite, M:OE, 
PP• 39-50, and Kl9mke, !!:!1 PP• 57-62. 
l5n, P• 6. 
16
"Reply"•yfQEM, P• 66. Nelson believes that there is an 
earlier and later ew in Moore's writings on analysis. Nelson 
also notes: "Although he CMooreJ was unclear about what the rela-
tion is between concepts, the entities objectively making up the 
universe, and verbal expressions, he appears to have thought that 
concepts are not only distinct trom and(at least from their side) 
independent ot their verbal expressions but also distinct from 
the entities objectively making up the universe." ("George Edward 
Moore", ~e Encp,lf&edia ot Philosophy'. Vol. 5. Ed. by Paul Fil.-
wards. lew for : cm111an and Fiee Press, 19671 p. 375). 
l?see White's discussion ot the analzsandum (M:OE, pp. 
50-3) tor numerous references. ---
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describing what he was about. 18 Despite the various terms Moore 
employed, there is an essential coherence in his descriptions ot 
analysis. 
Since • • • when he J:MooreJ talks of a proposition or 
concept he is talking in a misleading way about the meaniag 
ot expressions ot various kinds, it follows that to propose 
a proposition or concept tor the role of analzsandua is to 
say that it is the meanings of expressions 'that we 'tiave to 
analyse. Further, we saw that on his naming theory there 
is no important difference between talking ot an analysis 
of the entity ABC and an analysis ot the meaning of the 
expression 'ABC'• We JBa7 conclude, therefore, that these 
other genuine candidates for the role of ana~eandum, 
namely, entities and conoepts--expressions o y sl!p into 
the ring when the judge is not looking--are all one and 
the same candidate, namely, the meaning of an expression, 
in disguise.l9 
!his brings out the main relation between analysis and 
ordinary understanding or use, namely, analysis presupposes an 
runderstanding of the ordinary meaning of an expression or con-
cept: analysis is about the ordinary meaning of a ooncept. 20 
"Philosophy only analyses words of which we already know the mea-
lning, in the sense that we can use the word right, although we 
could not perhaps saz what it means."21 As this was expressad 
18Klemke's contused discussi~n of Moore's ase of analy-
sis overlooks Moore's remark: "There is, of course, a sense in 
~hieh verbal expressions o~n b& •analysad.'" But this is a non-
technical sense of analysis. "Reply", PGEM, p. 661. 
l9Wb.ite, MzCE, PP• 52-3. Moore•s position could also be 
put this way: the analfsandum. is commoa sense, tor the common 
sense view is not a oo~eotlon ot 2ro2ositions. (.Q!, p. 280). 
20sMPP, pp. 267-9. Ct. n. 14 above. 
21Moore, "!he Justification of Analysis", Anal;sis, 1 (1934), P• 28. See also: SMPP, PP• 2l6 1219,279e3otJ; u our Forms 
ot Scepticism", .fl1 pp. l~ "Detence", ,!l, p. 37. 
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later by others: there is a distinction between knowing how to 
use an expression or concept, and knowing the conditions under 
which the expression can be used correctly--and the latter de-
pends upon the former. 
So far, then, we have observed two things which help 
cla1•ity why Moore believed that "knowing X" does not imply "know-
ing the analysis of X": (i) "knowing the analysis ot X" is 
"knowing the t&chnical mean.i;ig of X"; and (ii) this is "knowing 
the technical meaning ot an idea of concept or proposition or 
meaning". 
Bow we can consider l1.2!! the meaning in question is ana-
lyzed, and the criteria ot an analysis. 
3. Kinds of Analyses. According to White's interpreta-
tion or Moore, there are three ways in which the analysis of the 
ordinary meaning of a concept may be carried out. The analysis 
may be by division, by analytic distinction, or bj inspection. 22 
22nemke suggests that the various kinds of analysis can 
be classified as follows. (EM, P• 68) 
"l. Retutational anirysis: 
(a) Showing contradictions; 
(b) Translation into the concrete; 
2. Distinctional analysis; 
3. Deoompositional analysis: 
(a) Definitional; 
(b) Divisional; 
4. Reductional analysis." 
However. this classification seems to be very misleading. 
For example, "refutational analysis" is not a description of ana-
lysis in its technical sense. What Klemke refers to as refuta-
tional analysis is actually an appeal to ordinary language. Ref· 
utational analysis is not so much a kind ot analysis as it is the 
purpose or result of distinctional analysis. llemke himself 
seems to have doubts about the appropriateness of hie acoount. 
(Cf. PP• 62 and 72). Moreover, Moore warned agliinet just this 
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(a) Analysis by Divis~. 23 One way or analyzing the 
eaning or a concept is by dividing a complex concept into its 
omponent parts. .An example of analysis by division is given in 
"!he Refutation or Idealism", where Moore analyzes the notion of 
sensation into two elements: c?nsciousness and the object of 
ons~iousness. 24 Similarly, a beli~t oan be analyzed into two 
act of belief and the object or beliet.25 
!'his type or 8.!lalysis is not particularly problematic. 
t it is worth noting a few characteristics of an analysis by 
ivision. First of all, there is no doubt that the analzsandUJll 
is a concept or entity. Tb.is is not clearly the case in other 
I I 
analyses. Secon1ly, the analysandum is not synonymous Ii 
analysans. as seems to be the case in the next kind ot 
considered. Furthermore, this type of analysis is only 
pplicable in dealing with complex concepts. Yellow and good, 
or example, "are notions ot that simple kind, ~ut of which deti-
analysesJ are composed and with which the power ot 
sort of contusion. (Ot. "Reply", PGEM,pp. 661, 664-5). See also 
• 36 above, and n. 27 below. ----
230n this type of analysis, ct. lJhite, M:OE, PP• ?3-4, 
201-8. White makes this 1nteresti!!S observation. "Moat philoso-
hers who took this division view rot analysisJ searched tor some 
timate set of elements trom whicn the other parts and wholes 
re to be built. Moore also hints that analysis must, it pushed 
far enough, get down to the simplest elements ••• But he did 
explicitly deny, somewhat in contrast to others, that the whole 
s nothing more than the sum ot its constituents.'' (p. 73). 
24PS, P• l?. 
-25Moore, SM.PP, p. 303. Ot. also PEt P• 189 tor an analy-
sis of "esthetic appreciation". --
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urtber defining Cor, divisionJ eeases."26 Finally, this type ot 
nalysis re~ults in new information. 
(b) Analysis bz Analytic Distinction.27 A second type ot 
alysis is referred to by White as "analytic distinction". !he 
aradigm of this kind of analys\s is: "The concept 'being a bro-
identical w!:th the concept 'being a male sibling•.u28 
is example pr~vidas the chief characteristics of an anRlytic 
istinction: (i) it is applicable to both simple and complex 
deas; (ii) the anal?$andum and the analysans are synonymous; 29 
iii) the analz~ans does not seem to be informative, rather it 
imply clarifies the analysandum; and therefore (iv) the "°alz-
the analysans seem to be verbal expressions. !he 
three characteristics give rise to a problem: the paradox of 
26PEt P• 8. 
-2.?or. White, M:OE, pp. 74-83. 'White also talks about 
oore•s use of "disorlmlnative distinction", wh~.ch is very simi-
ar (if not identical) to lOemk:e's discussion ot "distinctional 
alysis". (Ot. n. 20 above). Unlike Klemke, however, White 
oes not considgr discriminative distinction a type ot analysis. 
Despite what he Sli..YS, I think that Moore did not wish to identi- I 
y discriminative distinction with, or make it a part ot, analy- [; 
is and that he only appears to do so because of th9 ambiguity : I 
t the word 'distinction••" (MzOE, P• 78). White follows this 1 1 
tatement with tour reasons (p:-'78), and reitera·tes one ot them a i 1 
ittle later (p. 81). , , 
28
"Reply", PGEM, P• 664. White carelessly cites this as 
example or analysis by division. (M:OE, PP• 73-4) As Morris 
zerowitz says: this is not "the moder-l'or all analysis done in 
hilosophy." ("Moore and Philosophical Analysisn, SPM, p. 228). 
-29"In essence the Cnatural!stioJ tallacy is simply that 
t identifying or equating any two notions which in tact are dis-
1 inet, or of supposing two words to be synonymous which are not." 1
1 !1:.Q!, p. 124). 1 1 
I 1 
111:1 
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alysis.30 
!he paradox of analysis can be stated in this way. Every 
alysis is a statement which not only expresses an identity be-
ween the analzsandum and the analzsans, but which is also intor-
ative.31 However, (1) it an analysis is a statement of identity 
30Although this problem can be found in the writings ot 
egel and Frege, recent discussion was initiated by c. H. Lang-
ord' s formulation ot it in "!he Notion of Analysis in Moore's 
ilosopby", PGEM:, P• 323. Untortunately, Langford formulated 
he problem in ~erms of "verbal expressions"• which is mislead-
ng. It is not surprising, then, that Moore rejected both views 
f analysis which Langford presented in his essay. 
31In his "Reply", Moore gave the following conditions tor 
correct analysis: 
(1) "both analzsandum and anal1sans must be concepts or 
propositionsTI.e., meaningsJ, au, mere verbal exp 
sions." (p. ~) 
(2) "both anal\!andum and analysans • • • must in some 
sense, be tie same concept." (p. 666) (3) "the eXJ>ression used tor the analzsandum must be a 
difteriii\ expression from tha' used for the analz-
sans." (p. 666) 
(4) 1ihe eiiression used tor the analzsans must 9xplicit-!z men on concepts which are not explicitly men-
tioned by the expression used tor the an.alzsandum." 
(p. 666) 
(5) "the method of combination should be explicitly men-
tione<I by theexpress!on used tor the analzsans." 
(p. 663) 
(6) "nobody can know that the analzsandum applies to an 
object without knowing that the ana!zsans applies to 
it." (p. 663) 
(?) "nobody can verit7 that the analzsandum applies with-
out verifying that the analzsans applies." (p. 663) (8) "any expression which expresses the analzsandum must 
be S1'?lonymous with any expression wh!cS expresses the 
analzeana ... (p. 663) 
the ordering given here follows Klemke's. White reters 
o six conditions, because he combines (1) and (2) into a single 
on<friion; and he omits (8) because this is equivalent to condi-
ions (2) and (3). 
' 1111 , I'
! 
I 
i 
I 
tautology, and unintormative--and therefore is not 
n analysis; and (11) it an analysis is not a statement of iden-
ity-1 then it is not an analysis. Thie paradox is significant 
ecause it raises doubt as to the justification of Moore's dis-
inction between knowing a common sense statement to be true and 
owing the correct analysis of that statement. 
!he central problem in the paradox of analysis lies in 
list of criteria for a correct analysis. To be specific, 
ore maintains that analysis has to do with concepts, and not 
erbal expressions. However, given the criteria of being synony-
intormative, the two terms ot an analysis cannot be a 
they must be verbal expressions. This criticism is 
ased on nominalism or veritioationism. Given this stance, phil-
sophy is merely a "conversion analysis". 
In philosophy an c.nalysis is used to make a linguistic 
alteration, it is used to ~ustity a manoeuvre with ter-
minology. It is a linguistic conversion which in every 
instance creates the semantic il~usion that a theory a-
bout phenomena is being stated.3 
en we turn to the third type ot analysis, we find that this 
can be restated in terms ot Moore's notion ot meaning. 
(c) Analzsis by Inspection. Moore's basic view ot what 
s involved in an analysis is that of observing what it is that 
think, or have before our minds. Rather than being 
distinct method ot analysis, inspection is rather "the way to 
32Lazerowitz, .22• cit., P• 245. Ot. also Richard Rorty's 
troduction to !he Li;sriitrc furn. Ed. by R. Rorty. Chicago: 
niv. ot Ohioago-,ress~7. pp. 2?tt. 
5? 
test a proposed analysis".33 As was just mentioned, the central 
)roblem is Moore's contention that analysis deals with concepts 
or meanings. Lazerowitz puts it this way. 
~e picture of themselves that philosophical analysts 
create is that of people who examine the meanings ot 
terms, or the concepts denoted by them, more care~lly 
and with greater skill and penetration than is done by 
others. And furthermore, they make it look as it they 
are examining objects of a special, perhaps raritied 1 kind. !hey make it look as it they are examining ob~ects 
which accompany terms and are given with them by psycho-
logical contiguity ••• the written word "elephant," for 
example, is present to sight; its meaning, the concept 
elephant, is present to the mind. And a philosopher who 
practices analysis with the last of the above objectives 
in mind gives every appearance of believing that by care-
fully scrutinizing the concept ele~hant he will learn 
zoological facts about actual elep ants.34 
intite expresses the same point by saying: 
The picture, taken over trom his concept theory of mean-
in~, which Moore has of a person bent on ana1j'ilng a 
ion is that of him concentrating on, peering intently 
at, something behind and naked of words, which he holds 
before the mind's eye.35 
[n other words, Moore's "language suggests that something more 
than linguistic fact is thrown into clear light, that hidden 
raets about things are revealed."36 Lazerowitz offers this al-
ternative. 
!he picture ot the penetrating gazer into concepts changes 
it we replace the expression "meaning ot a term," ••• b7 
the expression •11teral use of a term." ••• It removes 
33M:CE, p. 6?; ct. also P• 112. 
34Lazerowitz, .!m• Si!•• P• 238. 
35M:OE, p. 61. Emphasis added. 
36Laserowitz, .2:2• s!!•t P• 240. 
the false notion that the meanings of words contain hidden 
tacts about things which analysis can bring to light.3? 
!'he preceding discussion has indicated that Moore's dis-
inction between knowing something and knowing its analysis rests 
naming theory ot meaning. And because ot this, Moore con-
ot philosophy as not only clarifying, but also discover-
ng things about the universe. Others have accepted Moore's dis-
inction, but base it on a use theory ot meaning. And because ot 
........... 
of philosophy as merely clarifying our lan-
age. Perhaps the only possibility lett tor Moore is analysis 
division. Jor this method ot analysis allows him to retain 
s theory of meaning. to discover things about the universe, 
d avoid the main objection of ordinary language philosophers, 
paradox of analysis. 
B. Oommon Sense and Philosopl!J:: 
fb.e basic issue to which we have addressed ourselves can 
e expressed as follows: what, precisely, is the relationship 
etween common sense and philosophy? The notion ot common sense 
emains unclear so long as this question is unanswered. In 
hapter 3t we considered whether or not the conflict which char-
cterizes this relationship is simply an apparent, linguistic 
ontlict. It would seem that there can be a real conflict only 
t the philosophical statements which contradict common sense 
ave an empirical content. 
3? Ibid., p. 239 • 
.............. 
I 
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In the present chapter, the problem has been shifted from 
realm of truth to that of meaning. With the distinction be-
ween "knowing X" and "knowing the analysis of X", Moore main-
ained that what is problematic is not the truth of common sense 
eliets, but their analysis or meaning. Philosophical statements 
e simply attempts to explicate and go beyond the ordin&r7 mean-
common sense beliefs, In this context, it seems that the 
a real conflict between common sense and philosophy qnlz 
t common sense beliefs have a meta sical content. this is 
he crucial issue. The matter might be stated in several ways. 
e can ask whether or not common sense has a philosophical con-
ent, i.e., whether common sense is philosophically neutral, or 
hilosophically committed. For example, doee the comm.on sense 
eliet in material objects imply that a philosophical analysis 
of this belief must result in a substantive or realist analysis--
a Moore thought? Or, we might inquire whether or not the ordi-
ry language in which common sense is expressed commits one to 
particular philosophical position. 
It is evident, then, that we have not arrived at a pre-
cise statement of Moore's notion of common sense, nor of the re-
lation between comm.on sense and philosophy. Ye have, however, 
stated the problem in a number of different ways, as Moore him-
self might have done. We, like Moore, have, in effect, remained 
adrift on the sea of analysis. 
I. 
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Symposium: The Character of Cognitive Acts. (B~ John Laird, 
G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and G. Dawes Hicks). ~· 
Arist. Soc., n.s., 21 (1921), 123-60; Moore's contrib., 
132-40. 
Principles of Logic. (Review of w. E. Johnson, Logic, Part 
I. Cambridge, 1921). The Times Literari Suppl., London, 
(Aug. 11, 192~, 508 b-c. Unsigned. Cf. 95. 
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An Analysis of Mind •. (Review of B. Russell, rue Analtois of ~· London, 1921). a't!e Times LiteraQ': UJ?p!., ndon, 
\oept. 29, 1921), 622 ~. Unsigned. 
Philosophical Studies. London: X. Paul, !Tench, !rrubner &r. 
eo.; Bew Tork: Bircourt, Brace & Oo., 1922. 
Contains: 
I. file Refutation of Idealism (1903) 1 1-30. II. !he Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
(1905), 31-96. 
'William James' "Pragmatism", (1908), 9?-146. 
Hume's Philosopb.3' (1909), 14?-6?. 
!he Status of Sense-Data (1914) 1 168-96. !he Conception of Reality (19l?J, 19?-219. 
Some Judgments of Perception (1918), 220-52. 
!he Conception of Intrinsic Value (First publ.), 
253-?S. 
IX. External and Internal Relations (1919), Revised, 
276-309. 
X. The Nature of Moral Philosopb.3' (First publ.), 310-
39. 
Reviews: 
Jordan, E. Pb.ilos. Rev., 33 (Jan., 1924) 1 88-98. 
Laird, J. M!iid, n.s., 32 (Jan., 1923) 1 86-92. 
-
Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or 
Particular? (By G. E. Moore, G. P. Stout, and G. Dawes 
Hicks). A£ist. Soc. Su~l. Vol. 3 (1923) 1 95-128; lfoore•s cOiiir!b., 9S:I1 • lepr.: l,?1 v. ?3. 
A Defence of Common Sense. jontemJ?Oraf!' British PhilosoRh.!• 
Second Series, ed. by J. • HU!rhea , ton4oni Ilien I 
Unwin; Bew York: Macmillan, 1925, 193-223. Repr.: U• 
v. ?3. 
Death of Dr. Mcfaggart. ~. n.s.,34 (Apr., 1925), 269-71. 
s,.mposium: !he :Nature of Sensible Appearances. (By G. Dawes 
Hicks, H. H. Price, G. E. Moore, and L. s. stebbing). 
Arist. Soc. SuJ?Rl• Vol. 6 (1926J, 142-2051 Moore's con-
ir1'6., 179:;a9. 
Review ot A. :N. Whitehead, Religion in the Maki~ (Bew York, 
1926), !he Nation and Atlienaeum, 1146. 12, 19 , 664. 
Symposium: "Pacts and Propositions." (By.,. P. Ramsey and 
G. E. Moore). A£&st. Soc. 8URPl. Vol. ? (192?), 153-206; 
Moore's contrib., !71-2~. Repr.: .fe, v. ?3. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
6?. 
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Symposium: Indirect Knowledge. (By G. E. Moore and H. W. B. 
Joseph). Arist. Soc. Suppl. Vol. 9 (1929), 19-66; Moore' 
contrib., 19-56. 
1930 
Preface, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical 
Essays, by F. P. Ramsey. F.d. by R. B. Braithwaite. ton 
~on:~. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, & Co., 1931, 1950, vii-viii. 
Is Goodness a Quality? (By G. E. Moore, H. W. B. Joseph, 
and A. E. Ta;ylor). Ari st. Soc. Supftl. Vol. 11 (1932), 
116-68; Moore's contr!b., 116-31. epr.: ~' v. ?3. 
Symposium: Imaginary Objects. (By G. Ryle, R. B. Braith-
waite and G. E. Moore). Arist. Soc • .a, SU:E,Pl. Vol. 12 (1933~ 1 18-?0; Moore's contrib., 55-76. Repr.: ~. v.73. 
The Justification of Analysis. (Notes of the fourth lectur 
given by Moore in a course on The Elements of Philosophy. 
Notes taken by Margaret Masterman and corrected by Prof. 
Moore). Analysis, 1 (1934), 28-30. 
Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate? (By w. KnP.ale and G. 
E. Noore). Arist. Soc.a Suvl• Vol. 15 (1936), 154-88; 
Moore's contrib., 175=8 • epr.: PP, v. 73. 
Proof of an External World. (Read Nov. 22, 1939). British 
Academy, Proc., 25 (1939), 273-300. Repr.: ~. v. 7~. 
1940 
An Autobiography. The Philosoph~ of G. E. Moore. Ed. by 
Paul A. Schilpp. EVanston an Chicago: Northwestern 
Univ., 1942, 3-39. 
A Reply to My Critics. The Philoso~h~ of G. E. Moore. Ed. 
by Paul A. Schilpp. 'E'Vanston anhlcago: Northwestern 
Univ., 1942, 535-677• 
Russell's "Theory of Descriptions." The Philosop~ of Ber-
trand Russell. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. EVans on anu 
Chicago: Northwestern Univ., 1944, 175-225. Repr.: EE• 
v. ?3. 
1950 
Addendum to My "Reply." The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 2d 
ed. Ed. by Paul A. Scfiiipp. New Turk: TUdor Pub!. Co., 
1952, 677-8?. Re: 82. 
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68. Letter to c. J. Ducasse. (:Dated Jeb. 8, 1943). Philos. 
thenomenol. Res., 28 (1968), 323-6. Repr.: PGIA, 2! ed., 
952, 681 4-E. • o~. 133. -
?O. 
?l. 
Some Main Problems of Philosophz. (Lectures given in 1910-
1911). tGn!on: George Xlien & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1953. 
Reviews: 
Ambrose, A. J. P.b.ilos.) 51 (K&Jr, 1954) 1 328-31. ~on) Clerf: Rev., 3~ \1954), ?52-3. 
Barnes, v. ~ t. Philos., 31 (1956), 362-6. 
Bouws~a, o. K. See: 105. 
OhishQlm, R. M. Philos. phenom. Res., 15 (June, 1955), 
5?1-2. 
Collins, J. Thought, 29 (1954), 28?-8. 
Cunningham, G. w. lthics, 64 (1953-1954), 331. 
DeMullewie, M~ !heoi. Pliilos., l? (1955), 554. 
Gardiner, P. ~ecfiator (OCt., 1953)t 434, 
McCarthy, E. ~l!os. Stud., 5 (1955J, 152-3. 
Ruja, B. Personaiist, 35 (1954), 304-5. · 
!he Times L!ter!!l Suipl., London (Jan. 22, 1954), 61. 
Vo11heim, I. liWSta esman and Nation, 46 (Nov., 1953), 
646. 
Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. Mind, 63 (1954), 1-
151 289-3161 64 (1955) 1 1-2?. Repr.: ]!, v. ?3. 
1'wo Correetions. (Concerning "'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 
1930-1933. III." See: 70). Mj.nd, 64 (1955) 1 264. Repr.: PP, v. 73. 
-
?2• Visual Sense-Data. British Philosophy in the Mid-Centef.:• 
.Ed. by c • .A. Mace. LOndon2 ~orgellien I Unwln Lt ., 
195?, 205-11; 2d ed., 1966, 203-11. 
?3. 
PUBLISHED POSTHUMOUSLY 
Philosophical ~era. (Introduction by c. D. Broad). Lon-
don: George A !en & Unwin Ltd.; Bew York: Macmillan Oo., 
1959. 
Contains: 
I. Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Uni-
versal or Particular? (1923), l?-31. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
A Defence of Common Sense. (1925) 1 35-59. Jlacts and Propositions. (1927), 60-88. 
Is Goodness a Quality? (1932), 89-101. 
Imag:tnary Objects. (1933), 102-14. 
Is Existence a Pr~dicate? (1936), 115-26. 
Proof of an External World. (1939), 12?-50. 
Russell's "Theory of Descriptions." (1944), 151-
95. 
74. 
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IX. Four Forms of Scepticism. (Jirst publ.), 196-
226. 
X. Certainty. (First publ.), 22?•51. 
XI. Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. (1954-5), 
252-324. 
Reviews: 
Two Corrections. (1955), 324. 
Ambrose, A. Philos. Rev., ?O (1961), 408-11. 
Chappell, V. 0. Ethics, ?O (1959-1960), 183. 
Lofthouse, w. P~ tonaon Quart. and Holborn Rev., (Jan., 
1961), 12.· 
Raschini, M. A. Giornale di Meta., 21 (1966), 682-4. 
Root, H. E. J. theoi. Stu!., 13 (1962), 23?-40. 
Shalom, A. ii. P61Ios., ~·(1959), 553. 
Teichmann, J. Mind, 70 (1961) 1 280. oee Times Literan:: Suppl., London, (Oct. ,o, 1959), 629. 
erkiie!ster, V. • Personalist 1 41 (1960), 520-1. White, A. R. Philos., 35 (19'>0J, 358-9· 
Wollheim, R. Apeotator (Jul7, 1959), 146. 
Commonplace Book i312-19~. F.d. by Casimir Lewy. London: 
George Il!en I nw!n d.; New York: !l'h.e PJ'a.cmillan Co., 
1962; New York: Humanities Press, 196?. 
Reviews: 
Ayer, A. J. Twentieth Cent., 1?2 (1963), 120. 
Granese, A. ltv. JIIos., 55 (1964), 343-?. 
Lazerowitz, ~ 39 (1964), 165-?3. 
MacICinnon, D. M. J. £heol. Stud., 14 (1963) 1 555-6. JQ-le. See: 239. 
Shalom, A. Et. Philos., 19 (1964), 113. 
Lectures on Philosol?,• F.d. by Casimir Lewy. London: 
CJeorge Allen I Unw n Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press, 
1966. . 
Contains: 
· Par·t I: Selections from course lectures, 1928-29. 
I. What is meant by "nature"?, 3-ll. 
II. Are material things real?, 12-19. 
III. "Real" and "imaginary-", 2<>-43. 
IV. Do we know that material things are real?, 44-52. 
T. Sense-data and sense-qualities, 53-?. 
VI. Sense-data, events and change, 58-66. 
VII. Perceptual continuity, 6?-76. 
VIII. Identity and places, ??-86. 
IX. !he representative theory of perception, 8?-103. 
Part II: Selections from course lectures, 1925-26. 
I. Classes and incomple·te symbols, l0?-28. 
II. Necessity, 129-31. 
III. Propositions and truth, 132-49. 
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i 
Part III: Selections trom eourse lectures, 1933-34 
I. What is analysis?, 153-64. 
I:C. The justification of analysis, 16~;-71. 
III. Questions of speculative philosophy, 1?2-9. 
IV. Other philosophical questions, 180-90. ·· 
v. Philosophical methods, 191-6. 
Reviews: . 
Louch, A. R. J. Hist. Philos., 6 (1968) t· 18~-~. 
Roelants, H. f!em'· t!Ios., 29 (l96?J, l8Q..I.~. 
Warnock, G. J. _, ?? (!~Jt 431-6. \ 
II. WORKS ABOUT MOORE 
ABBAGNANO, NICOLA. G. E. Moore ei Princi.ia 
sentazione della traduzione ital ana e 
oa, in corso di pubbl. presso l'ed Bompian -
Os'. t 54 (1963) t 44-64. ! ' i! \ 
I \, I \ ' 
ADDIS, LADD and LE\r/IS, DOUGLAS. Moore and, kle;
1 
ho ',;Oi,.tcil, 
°fists. Iowa City, Univ. or Iowa; fhe Hague:Mii't?nu~ ' 
I jlio!'t • 1965. . - < 
' ~ 
AMBROSE, ALICE. Moore's Proof of an External._ World. ~ 
(v. 280)• 394-417. Repr.: Essaya in Ana.lzsis. LoncronT 
'George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1 1966; 2!4:3~; bf.' 206. 
• !hree Aspects of Moore's Philosophy. (Read at a 
--.-e-e'""t""'lng in memory of G. E. Hooret Columbia Univ., Jan. 
15, 1959). J. Pb.ilos., 57 (l960J 1 816-24. Repr.: s in Analzs~r· tondon: George Allen & Unwin, 1966, 2 ......... -. 
R:IR (v. 9). 
AYD, A. J. G. E. Moore on Propositions and Facts. H:D, (v. 219) •. Repr.: MetaRbJ'sios and Common Sense. Ban 
Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & do., 19?0, 180:202. 
----·· Symposium: Does Philosophy Analyse Common Sense? (v. 139); .Ayer•s contrib.: 162-?6. 
----· the Terminology ot Sense-Data. 
• 289-'12, Repr.: Philosophical Essa.ya. 
Marti.n's Press, 1964, ~1'54. Re:o$. 
Mind, 54 (1945), 
lew York: st. 
or. 6? • 
BANERJEE, HIRANMOY. For the Best Statement of the Use or -
the Term •Proof" in G. E. Moore•s Supposed Proof of the 
External World, or For the Best Re-Statement ot the Sup-
posed Proof. Rev. Meta., 16 (1962), 133-7• Ct. 30?. 
84. BAlfERJI, KA.LI KRISHl'fA. G. E. Moore. Philos •.. Sl!!£t. ,A., 33 
(1960-1961), 93-102. 
86~ 
88. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
94. 
95. 
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BARNES, WINSTON H. The Philoso~hical Predicament. London: 
Adam & Charles Blae~, 1950,9-160. (Chapters 2-5). 
BARONE, FRANCESCO. George :Ed.ward Moore. Les Grands Cour-
ants de la pensee Mondiale Contemporaine.. ouvrage pu'6lie 
sous la direction de M~ F. Sciacca. III8 Partie: Por-
traits. Vol. II. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1'9b4°, 
1117::41. 
BAUMRIN, BERNARD H. Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy? ~· 
Philos. Quart., 5 (1968), 79-89. 
BAUSOLA, ADRIANO. La Filosofia Morale di G. E. Moore. !!.!.!• 
Filos. neoscol., 56 (1964), 376-408. 
BENTLEY, A.F. Logicians Underlying Postulations. 
Sci., 13 (1946), 3-19. 
-
Philos. 
BERGMANN, GUSTAV. Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence 
in G. E. Moore. Ingu11' V (1962), 116-42. Repr.: Logic 
and Reality. Madison: niv. of Wisconsin Press, 1964, 
I$t!-70. Repr.: SPM, (v. 208), 81-94. 
-
BLACK, MAX. How can Anal~sis Be Inf'ormative? Philos. phe-
nomenal. Ras •• 6 (1946), 628-31. Re: 213 • 
• On Speaking with the Vulgar. Philos. Rev., 58 
---c1-9--4-9), 616-21. Repr.: .fil!!, (v. 208), 226-S. Re: 231. 
____ .....,._. Review of Th~ Philosop~ of G. E. Moore. (v. 
286). J. Philos., 40 {1943), 682-95 • 
• The "Paradox of Analysis.'• Mind, 53 (1944), 263-
--.7-.-.... Re: 214. Cf. 123, 213, .314. -
• The "Paradox of Analysis" Again: A Reply. ~' 
--54-(-1945), 272-3. Re: 314. Cf. 311. 
96. BLACKSTONE, RICHARD M. An EXamination of the Philosophical 
Methods of G. E. Moore. Unpubl. Disser., Brown Univ., 
1968. 
97. BLANSHARD, BRAND. Linguistic Philosophy - Some Earlier 
Forms. Reason and Analysis. Londf)n: George Allen & Un-
win, 196~, 308-38. Re: 5~. 234. 
98. BLEGVAD, MOGENB. Mill, Moore, ar:d the Naturalistic Fallacy. 
Philosophical Essa\1Dedicatea to Gunnar Aspelin. Lund: 
c. ~. K: Gleerup, 63. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
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BOUWSMA, O.K. Moore's Theory of Sense-Data. PGEM, (v. 
280), 201-21. Repr.~ Philosophical Essazs. ""ll'iicoln: 
Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1965; 1-20. 
----· Reflections on Moore's Recent Book rsome Main 
Pro;lems of Philosophil. Philos. Rev., 64 (1955), 248-
63. Repr.: Philosophical Essa;Ys• London: Univ. of Neb-
raska .P:i:'ess, 1965, I29=48; M:ER, (v. 219). 
BRAITHWAITE, R.B. Geor~e Edward Moore, 1873-1958. Proc. 
Brit. Acad., 47 (1961), 293-309. Repr.: George Ed.Ward 
Moore, 1SZ3-195§. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963; 
H:'.ER, (v. 219}. 
-
• Verbal Ambigi1ity and Philosophical Analysis. 
--(~R-e_a_d-Mar. 19, 1928). Proc. Arist. Soc., 28 (1928), 135-
54. 
BROAD, C.D. Certain Features in Moore'3 Ethical Doctrines. 
~. (v. 280), 43-6?. 
• G. E. Moore. The Manchester Guardian (Oct. 25, 
---1-9-53--J-. Repr. with corrections and additions: ~' (v. 73) 
11-2. 
• G. E. Moore's Latest Published Views of Ethics. 
--Mi~n-a-,-70 (1961), 435-57. Repr.: M:ER, (v. 219). 
----· Is "Goodness" a Nam'9 of Simple, Non-natural Quality. Proc. Arist. Soc. (1934). Repr.:with some addi-
tions and moairications as part two (57-67) of: Certain 
Features ••• (v. 103). 
----· 
Phi.losop:hy and "Common Sense." ~. (v. 219). 
108. • Symposium: Is There "Knowledg3 by Acquaintance''~ 
(v. 44); Rroad's contrib., 206-20. 
109. BROYLES, JAMES E. Language and Common Sense. Amer. Philos. 
Quart., 6 (1969), 233-9 • 
110. 
. 
BRUNIUS, TEDDY. G. E. Moore's Anallsis of Beautz. Uppso-
la, Sweden: Almquist & \Jiksells, 965. 
111. J3UBSER, EBERHARD. Ethisch'3 Etud. Philos. Rundsch., 16 
(1969), 77-92. 
112. • Moore und der Common Sense. Arch. fur Philos., 
8 (I'J.58), 145-55. 
i: 
!' 
I 
11 
!ii 
'I 
II,, 
J 
I 
t 
1 
' I 
t 
I 
72 
113. CAI1PANAI,E, DOMENICO. Filoso.fia ed Etica Scientifica nel 
Pensiero di~. E. Moore. Bari: Adr1at1ca ~itr., 1962. 
llil. 
115. 
llf>. 
11?. 
llR. 
CAMP.BELL, C.A. Common-Sense Propositions and Philosophical 
Paradoxes. Proc. Arist. Soc., 45 (1944)~ 1-25. Re: 234. 
CARGILE, JAMES. On Believing You Believe. Analysis, 27 
(1967), 177-83. 
CARNEY, JAMES D. Malcolm and Moore's Rebuttals. 
(1962), 353-63. Re: 230. 
• Was Moore Talking Nonsense in 1918? 
__ p_h_e_n_o-menol. Res., 22 (1962), 521-?. 
Mind, 71 
-
Philos. 
CARTER, ROBF.RT R. The Importance of Intrinsic Value. 
Ph.ilos. phenomenol. Res., 28 (1968), 567-??. 
119. CHAPPELL, V.C. Malcolm on Moore. ~i 70 (1961), 417-25. 
Re: ?30,234. 
120. CHARLESWORTH, MPJCWELL. George F.dward Moore: Common Sense 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
and Analysis. Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis. Pitts~ 
burg~ Duquesne Univ. Press, 1959 ·, 11-IJ'.6. 
CHAT'!'ERJI 1 G.C. G. E. Moore as I Knew Him~ Fhilos. Quart. !,.., 33 \1960-1961), 71-8. 
CHISHOLM. R.M. Philosophers and Ordinary Language. Philos. 
~·• 60 (1951), 317-28. Re: 234. Cf. 236. 
CHURCH, ALONZO. On the .Pe.radox of Analysis. J. symbol. 
Logic, 11 (1946), 132-3. Re: 94. 
CLEARY, DENIS. An Essay on G. E. Moore. Downs~Rev., 81 
(1963), 212-25. 
COATES, ADRIAN. Professor Moore and the Philosophy of Com-
mon Sense. A 8cettical Ex:fil'lin~tion of Contemporary Brit-
ish Philosophy. · on<Ion: Brentano 1s, 1929, 23L1--56. 
126. COBITZ, J.L. The Appeal to Ordinary Language • .AI'.alysis, 
11 (1950), 9-Jl. Re: 234. 
127. 
128. 
GO~~~~l~~~5; 4~2:~9~1 and Non-Natural Qualities. Philos., 
COPLESTON, FRBDERICK, S.Jo G. E. Muore and .li.nalysis. A 
distoJ.'Y o.f l.)hiloPophy. Vol. VIII. Wes'tminister, Md.! 
Newman Press, 1966, 402-24. 
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I 
I 
I 
I j 
129. DALY, C.B. G. E. Moore and Non-naturalism in Ethics. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137· 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
142. 
Philos. Stud., 12 (1963), 25-65. 
DEVAUX, PHILIPPE. George Edward Moore. Rev. int. Philos., 
12 (1958), 414-5. 
• George Filward Moore (18?3-1958). Rev. philos. 
_Fi'_an_c_e Etrang., 83 (1958), 556-8. 
DICKOFF, JAMES W. Analytic Ethics: From Moore to Good as 
an External Mode. Unpubl. Disser., Yale Univ., 1962. 
DUCASSE, C.J. Letters to G. E. Moore. (Dated Jan. 25 and 
Mar. 4, 1943). Philoa. phenomenal. Res., 28 (1968), 320-3, 326-31. Repr.: PGEM, (v. 280), 687-7d, 68?h-n. Re: 
65, 75. 
• Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism." PGEM, 
--cv-.-2-80), 225-51. -
DUFUMIER, HENRY. Les Th,ories Logico-Metaphysiques de MM. 
B. Russell et G. E. Moore. Rev. de Meta. et de Mor., l? 
(1909), 620-53. Re: 6. 
DUMMETT, MICHAEL. A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the 
Unreality of Time. Philos. Rev., 69 (1960), 49?-504. 
DUNCAN-JONES, AUSTIN E. G. E. Moore: Some Impressions. 
Analysis, 19 (1958-1959), 25-6. 
• Intrinsic Value: Some Comments on the Work of 
-G-.-E-.-Moore. Philos., 33 (1958), 240-?3. Repr.: !ll!!l• 
(v. 219). 
and AYER, A.J. Symposium.: Does Philosoph~ Analyze 
__ C_o_mm __ o_n Sense? Arist. Soc., Suppl. Vol. 16 (193?), 139-
?6. Duncan-Jones* contrib., 139-61. 
EDEL, ABRAHAM. The Logical Structure of G. E. Moore's 
Ethical Theory. ~, ( v. 280), 13?-?6. 
EDGELL, BEATRICE. Sym:posium.: Is There "Knowledge by Ac-
quaintance''? (v. 44); Filgell' s contrib., 194-205. 
EPSTEIN, FANNY. On the Definition of Moral Goodness. 
Iyyµn, 19 (1968), 153-69. 
143. EWING, A.C. G. E. Moore. ~' ?l (1962), 251. 
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154. 
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---i__.._.,,._. Knowledge of Physical Objects. Mind, 52 (1943), 97-121. Repr.: Non-Lingnistic Philosop&:--Iondon: 
George Allen & Unwin, !968, 67-91. Re: 63. 
• 
----
Moore and Metaphysics • M: ER, (v. 219). 
-
,. Pseua.o-Solutions. Proc. Arist. Soc., 57 (1956), 
--;-1---5-2-. Repr.: Non-Lin~istic Philosophy. tondon: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1968, I72i=92. Re: 234: 
FIELD, G.C. The Place of Definition in Ethics. Studies in 
PhilosoEhy. Bristol, Eng.: Univ. of Bristol, 1935. 
~epr.: Readings in Ethical Theory. Ed. by Sellars & Hos-
pers. New York: Appleton-Century-nrofts, 1952, 92-102. 
FINDLAY, J.N. Some Ne~lected Issues in the Philosophy of 
G. E. Moore. M:ER, {219). 
-
FOGEJ4IN, ROBERT J. Variations on a Four-Part Theme. Evi-
dence and Meaning. New York: Humanities Press, 196?-;--
ll'i-38. Re: 1'i. 
FRANKENA, WILLIAM K. The Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind, 48 (1939), 464-77. Repr.: Readin~s in Ethical Theory. Ed. 
by Sellars & Hospers. New Yor : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1952, 103-14. Repr.: SPM, (v. 208), 30-43. 
-
----· Obligation ruid Value in 
Roore. PGEM, (v. 280), 93-110. the Ethics of G. E. 
-
FRANKS, GABRIEL, o.s.B. 
Some Ethical Theories. 
George Edward Moore's Criticism of 
Thomist, 31 (1967), 259-81. 
--------· Virginia Wolff and the Philosophy of G. E. Moore 
Personalist, 50 (1969), 222-40. 
• Was G. E. Moore Mlstaken Ahout Brentano? 
---ia•c_h_o_i_as., 43 (1969), 252-68. New -
155. GARGANI, ALDO GIORGIO. Lineu_aggio e Societa in G. E. 
Moore e Nell 'ultimo Wittgenstein. G. crit. Filos. ital., 
44 (1965), 98-J.18. 
156. GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL •. Moore's Theory of Moral Freedom and 
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